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Abstract: 
 
Indigenous groups account for over one tenth of Mexico‟s population and many of them 
suffer from constant social disadvantages and extreme marginalization.  One of their few paths 
out of poverty is through the accumulation of human capital, which is a central element of 
Oportunidades‟ strategy to ameliorate trans-generational poverty.  This study finds that the 
positive impacts of Oportunidades on enrollment for the general population are no different for 
indigenous households.  In addition, it finds that Oportunidades impacts on repeat and illness 
rates are consistently marginal.  Thus, it is argued that unless tailored investment in indigenous 
human capital accumulation and complimentary alternatives are intensified to close the existing 
indigenous marginalization gaps, indigenous Mexicans will remain in profound and persistent 
poverty due to the unique and overwhelming obstacles they face. 
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1. Introduction: 
Over 40 million indigenous people live in Latin America, making up approximately 8% 
of its population.
1
  Regrettably, indigenous populations in the region (and beyond) are seriously 
disadvantaged.  They are more likely than any other group to be poor and live in generally 
abysmal conditions.
2
  Indigenous Latin Americans possess considerably lower endowments of 
human capital, are more than twice as likely to be employed as youths, and earn less on average 
that their non-indigenous counterparts.
3
  Not surprisingly, there is a strong correlation between 
schooling attainment, ethnicity, and poverty incidence in the region.
4
  Although paths out of 
poverty do exist, they are difficult to identify, challenging, and scarce.  As a result, reducing 
education, health, and nutrition gaps is often one of the clearest, most significant, and readily 
available ways to minimize earning differentials and alleviate poverty, especially for indigenous 
populations.
5
  Oddly enough, antipoverty policies in the region have not historically focused on 
the lack of investment in human capital as a fundamental reason for the persistence of poverty.
6
 
The largest indigenous population in Latin America lives in Mexico: approximately 12 
million people, accounting for 13% of its total population.
7
  Unfortunately, their experience has 
been no better than that of other indigenous groups in the region.  One empirical study illustrates 
that over 80% of the Mexican indigenous population lives in regions with a very high level of 
marginalization.
8
   It also shows that just under 80% of economically active citizens living in 
especially indigenous states, such as Oaxaca, Chiapas, Guerrero, Hidalgo, Puebla, and Yucatan, 
earn less than minimum salaries.
9
   
Subsequently, municipalities with indigenous populations above 40% have an incidence 
of extreme poverty (around 45%) that is nine times as high as the rate for municipalities with less 
than a 10% indigenous population (a 5% incidence).
10
  This high level of persistent poverty 
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exacerbates the need for indigenous youths in Mexico to join the workforce (to make ends meet) 
and abandon their formal education, which stunts their human capital attainment and future 
earning opportunities.  The same study above finds that indigenous children in Mexico are 13% 
more likely not to be in school than their non-indigenous counterparts and more likely to work.
11
 
Though indigenous groups in Mexico are distinctly marginalized, poverty is not a critical 
disadvantage unique to them.  Despite numerous anti-poverty efforts, such as PRONASOL and 
PROCAMPO, approximately 20% of all Mexicans were extremely poor in 1995 – 40% of them 
being rural children whose welfare is awfully vulnerable.
12
  This dire state of affairs, a product of 
years of social and economic exclusion, was greatly exacerbated by Mexico‟s 1994 Peso Crisis, 
which worsened conditions for the poor, squeezed public finances, and dried up social 
spending.
13
  As a result: 
“More than one fifth of all families were unable to purchase a basic food basket 
to meet their nutritional needs, affecting their health, ability to learn, 
opportunities for employment, and their access to higher income.  In some 
communities, malnutrition was the third cause of infant mortality; close to 10 
million Mexicans lacked regular access to basic health care; more than 1.5 
million children between the ages of 6 and 14 were out of school; and in 
disadvantaged communities illiteracy tripled the national average, and school 
dropout and failure rates doubled it...”14 
 
Moreover, a national census from 1994/1995 indicated that 18.6% of children were short 
for their age, nearly equivalent to a two year lag in growth.
15
  Prevalence of malnutrition and 
stunting was highest in Chiapas and Oaxaca, two of the most southern and indigenous states in 
Mexico.
16
  Making this worse is the lack of health services available to the poor.  This is 
reflected by the fact that the infant mortality rate for the poor (49 per 1,000 live births) is twice 
as high as the rate for the non-poor.
17
  Compounding this situation is the finding that almost half 
of poor children age fifteen and older did not complete primary school; this is the case with only 
one in five non-poor children.
18
  In addition, over 30% of poor children age twelve to fifteen 
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work to support their families, which negatively impacts their schooling.
19
  Poor households, on 
average, have one and a half more family members (5.8) than non-poor families and live in twice 
as crowded dwellings (3.8 individuals per room).
20
  Moreover, 60% of people working in rural 
areas are landless and 56% of rural production units reported absolutely no production or were 
used strictly for subsistence consumption.
21
  It becomes evident that rural individuals have little 
access to assets other than their own labor and Mexico‟s poor (many of whom are rural) are in 
dire need of support. 
 In order to combat these issues of poverty and disparity for both indigenous and non-
indigenous population, the Social Development Department of the Mexican government 
(SEDSOL) launched a program in August 1997 by the name of PROGRESA – the Education, 
Health, and Food Program, of Mexico – now known as Oportunidades.22  It is designed to 
increase the human capital of poor households via the disbursement of conditioned cash transfers.  
Oportunidades provides conditioned cash transfers to mothers of poor families (primarily in rural 
areas where poverty is three times more likely than in urban areas) every two months, if the 
household is poor enough and its members meet certain co-responsibilities.
23
   Attending 
periodic medical check-ups and health talks or having children attend at least 85% of school days 
during the previous two month period are examples of the program‟s conditions.24  It should also 
be noted that Oportunidades‟ design and implementation, which will be explained later in section 
five, is particularly unique not only because of its mix of components, but also because of its 
experimental design that facilitates rigorous evaluation of its impacts.
25
 
As such, the program aims to minimize current poverty levels and increase the future 
productivity of children from poor families to improve household welfare in the long run.  By 
1999, Oportunidades covered roughly 2.6 million households, nearly one 9
th
 of all Mexican 
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families, and 40% of all rural households at a cost of $777 million (0.2% of 1999‟s Gross 
Domestic Product – GDP).26 Since then it has significantly expanded its efforts to become the 
most comprehensive conditional cash transfer program in the world.
27
  Oportunidades recently 
culminated its eighth year of operations with over 5 million poor Mexican beneficiary 
households on its roster (or approximately 30 million people).
28
  It currently spends 
approximately US $2.7 billion a year and plans to continue growing based on its success.
29
   
A number of papers (which will be briefly summarized later) have been written assessing 
this program‟s impact on a variety of factors, such as dropout rates, anemia rates, child labor, 
consumption, and severity of poverty; nonetheless, Oportunidades' impact on Mexico‟s 
indigenous population has not received much attention.
30
  Consequently, this paper is devoted to 
assessing the impact of Oportunidades on the capital accumulation of Mexico‟s indigenous poor.  
It aims to distinguish the program‟s impacts for indigenous beneficiaries from impacts for the 
general or average beneficiary population.  In other words, this study tests the hypothesis that the 
impact of Oportunidades on human capital (measured by school enrollment, progression, repeat, 
and illness rates) will differ between the general beneficiary population and indigenous 
beneficiary population. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 details the intricacies of 
Oportunidades and section 3 provides the conceptual framework this study is based upon.  Next, 
section 4 describes the data analyzed and section 5 explains the triple difference estimator used 
to assess Oportunidades.  Lastly, section 6 shares this paper‟s findings and section 7 concludes 
by highlighting its policy implications. 
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2. A Description of Oportunidades  
 A. The Implementation of a Multi-pronged Approach: 
Poverty alleviation programs:  
 
“…must try to eliminate, or at least reduce, the trade-off between income 
transfers that increase present consumption and income transfers that facilitate 
investments to enable more consumption in the future…,” to unlock 
opportunities for people to eventually get ahead with their own efforts.
31  
 
 In the long run Oportunidades‟ strategy is based on human capital theory (which is 
examined in the following section) and aims to act as a safety rope that helps people climb out of 
poverty by preventing the transmission of intergenerational poverty.
32
  In the short term, its 
approach is rooted in the idea that poor families are unable to overcome the bevy of constraints 
they face now; thus a subsidy from the outside is needed to make ends meet.  Oportunidades also 
acts as a safety net that catches tremendously marginalized households and props them up before 
they fall further below a predetermined poverty threshold.  In essence, Oportunidades is “an 
effort to break the entangling web of poverty where malnutrition, morbidity, high infant 
mortality rates, high fertility, school dropout rates and unhealthy living conditions prevail.”33  
This is accomplished not only by providing incentives (via transfers) that lower opportunity costs, 
but also by bolstering the supply of services and actively promoting their use.
34
  
The initial implementation of Oportunidades involved four distinct stages that were 
focused on targeting and treating exceptionally poor families in a manner that would allow for 
subsequent rigorous evaluation.  The first stage involved the detection of the most marginal, rural 
communities where the extremely poor households were likely to be found.
35
  This was based on 
a marginality index (developed from national census data) and took into account geographical 
location, locality size, distance between localities, and access to supporting infrastructure (such 
as a secondary school or health clinic).
36
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In order to facilitate the distribution of benefits, implementation of the program takes 
place in a random geographic manner (due to funding limitations); however, in practice the 
thrust of Oportunidades is family-based.
37
  Its focus is on directly transferring resources to the 
households in extreme and structural poverty who can benefit from Oportunidades the most.
38
  
Though all impoverished families are in need of help, not all poor households are equally poor.  
Consequently, Oportunidades‟ initial implementation has aimed to reach families who suffer 
from the greatest depth and severity of poverty first.  One empirical study estimates that the 
depth of poverty in 1994 experienced by a rural household was four times the depth experienced 
by an average household (including both rural and urban).
39
  The finding suggests that a rural 
household‟s depth of poverty was ten times higher than an urban household‟s.40  Similarly, the 
same study finds that the severity of poverty experienced by a rural household is approximately 
three times higher than an average household‟s.41  This estimate implies that a rural household‟s 
severity of poverty was twelve times higher than an urban household‟s.42  Once again, this 
underscores the need to target rural households. 
The second stage involved the selection of treatment and control households within 
eligible communities via a discriminant analysis of household income and other characteristics.
43
  
During the third stage, a scoring system based on objective data, such as a standardized poverty 
line, was applied to individual questionnaires in order to ensure that the poor receive far 
consideration regardless of where they live.
44
  Finally, lists of eligible beneficiaries were 
presented at community assemblies where amendments were made and final approval was 
granted so that treatment could begin.
45
  This method of implementation has paid dividends: all 
communities selected to be Oportunidades participants took advantage of the program and the 
household take-up rate was (and continues to be) over 90%. 
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Unlike other social programs in Mexico, Oportunidades is multi-pronged – it deals with 
health, nutrition, and education simultaneously.  Addressing these issues together leads to greater 
social returns than individual interventions.
46
  This is because “deficiencies in education, 
nutrition and health are both cause and effect of persistent marginalization, and that they are 
closely interrelated.”47  Justifying for Oportunidades‟ multi-pronged approach is clear in the 
empirical literature, which demonstrates links between (i) food supply, nutrition, and health, (ii) 
infant mortality, fertility, and health, (iii) family size, income, and education, as well as (iv) low 
income and risk aversion.
48
   
Moreover, Oportunidades‟ strategy takes advantage of positive cross-life cycle synergies, 
such as the impact of preschool nutrition on schooling success, adult wages, and productivity.
49
  
In other words, health and nutrition enhancements, which are valuable on their own, will directly 
enhance the effectiveness of education via school attendance and performance improvements for 
the poor today, which will pay dividends in the long run.
50
   Oportunidades takes this multi-
pronged approach because it is the most suitable way to break the vicious cycle of poverty that 
perpetuates itself across generations.  These synergies between education, health, and nutrition 
interventions are necessary to manifest positive short term outcomes and those that are lagged 
over time.
51
   
It should also be noted that these interconnected benefits must be sustained over time to 
truly make a substantial impact on the eradication of poverty.
52
  This is because advancements in 
education, health, and nutrition are results of a cumulative process, not temporary surges.  
Consequently, Oportunidades tries to provide “a comprehensive, continued, and long-term 
approach to establish conditions for poor families to take advantage of opportunities created by 
economic growth and broad social policy programs, and to lay the groundwork for a lasting 
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improvement in their incomes and quality of life.” 53   This is the explanation for why 
Oportunidades‟ system of interventions can begin at birth and last through high school 
graduation and pregnancy. 
In essence, the program fights a spiraling web of chronic poverty by attacking it at 
multiple levels and times.  Although the structure of Oportunidades is complicated, it is also 
flexible enough to meet the needs of impoverished families in widely varying circumstances.  In 
order to maximize the benefits associated with Oportunidades, the program also works in 
conjunction with numerous other complimentary projects.   Examples include interventions that 
focus on generating employment and diversifying income options (such as the Temporary 
Employment Program), as well projects that developing promote the formation of physical 
capital (such as the State Municipal Social Infrastructure Fund).  In combination, it employs this 
strategy to meet the following six objectives:
54
    
“(i) integrate and systematize measures to improve the educational, health, and 
nutritional status of families living in extreme poverty; (ii) aid children complete 
basic education eliminating their need to perform tasks that interfere with school 
attendance, and prevent school performance from being affected by illness or diet 
deficiencies; (iii) eliminate malnutrition, lower morbidity, mortality and fertility 
rates, and improve family health through a preventative approach including 
access to information on nutrition, hygiene, and environmental sanitation; (iv) 
modify the risk structure faced by poor families reducing uncertainty in 
consumption and risks associated with catastrophic health events, and promote 
long-term investment in projects such as children‟s education; (v) Encourage 
responsibility and active participation by all family members to improve their 
education, health, and nutrition; and, (vi) redistribute national income towards 
poor families.”55 
 
B. Operational Components: 
In practice, these six objectives are implemented via Oportunidades‟ three key 
components.  The first component, an education intervention, is seen as a strategic factor in 
breaking the vicious cycle of poverty because it serves as the strong empirical link between 
human capital, productivity, and growth.
56
  The education component can be broken down into 
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four channels: (i) a system of education grants; (ii) monetary support for the acquisition of 
school material; (iii) strengthening the supply and quality of education services; and, (iv) 
cultivation of parental responsibility for, and appreciation of the advantages stemming from, 
their children‟s education.57  The focal point of this component is the education grant, which is 
intended to “enable children and young adults to complete basic education, promote enrollment, 
regular attendance, and parental participation in children‟s school performance.”58 
When Oportunidades was originally implemented, children between third and ninth grade 
who are younger than age eighteen, were eligible to receive grants conditioned on their school 
attendance, as well as a transfer to purchase and replace school supplies.
59
  In 2001/2002, 
students enrolled in high school under the age of twenty-two also become eligible for these 
conditioned grants and students who complete high school became eligible for an additional 
transfer in 2003.
60
  Enrollment grants are paid every two months to mothers during the academic 
year (lasting 10 months) and are contingent on students attending at least 85% of classes in each 
preceding monthly period.
 61
  Transfers increase according to grade levels, when the opportunity 
costs of not working rises, and are higher for girls beginning in secondary school (seventh grade) 
to counteract the fact that girls tend to leave school earlier.
62
 
Grants for school supplies also increase in secondary school.  In primary school they are 
paid twice during the academic year, at the beginning of the school year (with proof of 
enrollment) and in February to replace supplies (with proof of continued attendance).
63
  School 
supply transfers are paid in cash, unless the primary school is supported by CONAFE (Consejo 
Nacional de Fomento Educativo); in such a case the first grant is provided to the school, which 
provides the supplies directly to students.
64
  All education grants help compensate households for 
the opportunity costs associated with sending children to school instead of to work where they 
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can earn much needed income.
65
  Table 1 below illustrates the transfer plan as it applied to 
education transfers: 
Table 1: Value of Transfers Per Child 
from July to December of 2002 (in 2002 pesos)
66
 
School Year: Attendance: 
Transfer: 
Supply Transfer: 
   Primary School   
       Third Grade 100 200 
       Fourth Grade 115 200 
       Fifth Grade 150 200 
       Sixth Grade 200 200 
   Secondary School Boys Girls  
       Seventh Grade 290 310 250 
       Eight Grade  310 340 250 
       Ninth Grade 325 375 250 
   High School    
       Tenth Grade 490 565 250 
       Eleventh Grade 525 600 250 
       Twelfth Grade 555 635 250 
 
The second component, a health intervention, focuses on enhancing health and nutritional 
status of the household, especially mothers and children.
67
  This component can be broken down 
into three elements put into practice via the Ministry of Health and IMSS-Solidardad, a branch of 
the Mexican Social Security Institute:
68
 (i) a basic package of services, including medicines 
provided free of charge; (ii) educational trainings on health, nutrition, and hygiene topics to 
promote self care by families and communities; and, (iii) strengthening the supply of health care 
services to meet additional demand.
69
  In general, the idea is to afford basic health care for all 
family members by promoting a preventative approach and disseminating information.
70
   
A pre-emptive health care approach enables households to anticipate both the causes and 
presence of illness to decrease the incidence of it.
71
  This is why all family members are required 
to regularly visit health centers according to a schedule determined by their age and individual 
health risk characteristics.
72
  This timetable can be found in Table 2 on the following page.  
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Although Oportunidades focuses on preventative care, this does not ignore the need for curative 
methods required to control and eliminate the spread of disease.
73
 
Table 2: Schedule of Required Health Care Visits
74
 
Group: Frequency: 
   Children  
       Younger than 4 months Three yearly check-ups: at 7 & 28 days, as well as 2 months 
       4 months to 24 months Eight yearly check-ups: at 4, 6, 9, 12, 15, 18, 21, & 24 
months, as well as a monthly checkup for weight & height 
        2 to 4 years Three yearly check-ups: one every 4 months 
       5-16 years Two yearly check-ups: one every 6 months 
   Women  
       Pregnant Five check-ups: throughout the prenatal period 
       Nursing  Two check-ups: one during puerperium & lactation 
   Adults & Youths  
       17 & over One yearly check-up 
 
Health education trainings are principally targeted at mothers, the primary household 
caretakers, though some topics require the entire household‟s attendance.75  Monthly sessions 
cover approximately 35 subjects (as illustrated in Table 3 on the following page) and promote 
changes in attitudes and habits.
76
  An emphasis is placed on ways to prevent and reduce health 
risks, how to recognize signs or symptoms of sickness, and how to follow appropriate primary 
care procedures; these topics and other important health education messages are followed up on 
with patients during check-ups.
77
  Recordings of health talks are aired on the radio for the 
general population and videos in native tongues are available for indigenous households.
78
   
Oportunidades also provides funds to bolster the supply of health services available to 
patients at public sector institutions.  They ensure adequate supply of equipment, encourage top 
quality staff to work in remote areas for extended periods, provide necessary medicines or 
education materials as needed, and offer additional staff trainings to improve the quality of 
medical attention and operation of services.
79
  These resources are vital to the efficiency and 
effectiveness of health services, as well as meeting additional demand created by the program.
80
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Table 3: Health Education & Promotion Talks
81
 
1. Food supplements 19. Parasites 
2. Food & health 20. Acute respiratory infections 
3. Basic hygiene* 21. Pulmonary tuberculosis 
4. Social participation 22. Hypertension & diabetes* 
5. Adolescence & Sexuality** 23. Accident prevention* 
6. Family planning** 24. Management of injuries 
7. Motherhood & risk 25. Dental health 
8. Pregnancy 26. Vector-borne illness* 
9. Nutrition during pregnancy & lactation 27. Addictions** 
10. Birth & the post-partum period 28. Sexually transmitted diseases** 
11. The newborn 
12 
29. HIV/AIDs** 
12. Breast-feeding 30. Gender equity** 
13. Breast & cervical cancer 31. Family dysfunction & domestic 
violence* 
14. Infants under one year 32. Pre-menopause & menopause 
15. Toddlers over one year 33. Basic disaster readiness* 
16. Vaccinations 34. Caring for the elderly* 
17. Diarrhea 35. Disabilities 
18. Oral rehydration  
Notes:  
i)  One asterisk (*) indicates that high school students receiving education grants must attend 
these talks as of 2001 in order to receive education grants. 
ii)  Two asterisks (**) indicate that male parents are also asked to attend these talks, though their 
attendance has no effect on receipt of benefits. 
 
The final component, a nutrition intervention, places a spotlight on the prevention of 
malnutrition in infants and small children, as well as pregnant and nursing mothers, which is 
particularly detrimental to the future cognitive and physical development of children.
82
  It offers 
two different benefits: (i) in kind nutritional supplements and (ii) a cash transfer intended to 
improve the nutrition level of privately purchased food.
83
  This component provides “subsidies to 
improve food consumption and the nutritional status of vulnerable family members.”84 
Nutrition supplements are provided year round at no cost to children between the ages of 
four months and two years (they are not provided earlier to encourage breast feeding to infants), 
to children between the ages of two and four who are malnutritioned, and to pregnant or nursing 
mothers.
85
  Supplements are granted at check-ups to mothers who are informed of their child‟s 
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nutritional status and how to correctly administer the supplements.
86
  They aim to minimize 
inequalities in intra-household food allocation and right micronutrient deficiencies.
87
   
Table 4: Nutritional Content of Supplements
88
 
Nutrient: Children: Pregnant & Nursing Mothers: 
   Protein 5.8g 120g 
   Energy 194 kcal 250kcal 
   Fat 6.6g 11.2g 
   Carbohydrates 27.9g 25.3g 
   Sodium 24.5 mg 81.2mg 
   Iron 10mg 15mg 
   Zinc 10mg 15mg 
100 
   Iodine 0mg 100mg 
   Vitamin A 400 mg 0mg 
   Vitamin B 
Vi 
6 mg 10mg 
   Vitamin B12 40 mg 70mg 
   Vitamin C 0.7 2.6mg 
   Folic Acid 50mg 100mg 
 
As shown in table 4 above, two types of supplements, which are customized for children 
and mothers, supply 100% of daily micronutrient needs and approximately 20% of required daily 
calories.
89
  Lastly, households can also obtain a cash transfer for food at a value of 150 pesos per 
month (in 2002 pesos).
90
  This benefit is specifically conditioned on the attendance of all family 
members at mandatory check-ups as well as the mother‟s presence at monthly health talks 
discussed earlier.
91
  It, like all others, is disbursed only to mothers because they are generally the 
individual responsible for making shopping choices, cooking food, and looking after children‟s 
health and education; though this is not always the case.
92
   
C. Values, Costs, Coverage, & Progress: 
 The maximum monthly value of transfers that households can receive for education and 
food grants is capped at a value of 750 pesos (in 2002 pesos) to avoid a situation where 
beneficiaries may become dependent on public assistance; reducing a family‟s incentives to 
improve income and living conditions would be counterproductive in the long run.
93
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Consequently, Oportunidades‟ is designed so that the total value of monetary transfers fluctuates 
along with a households‟ life cycle.94  In addition, most of the money families receive from 
Oportunidades comes in the form of education grants tied to children‟s school attendance 
(instead of food transfers), which are phased out over time (as students progress) in order not to 
encourage large families.
95
  Lastly, households are entitled to participate in the program for three 
years, at which time they must go through a process of re-certification, if they wish to continue 
for three more.
96
  Interestingly, the nominal values of all transfers (education and food) are 
indexed to the National Consumer Price Index (which reflects the cost of living) and adjusted 
every six months to ensure that the real value of the grants is maintained.
97
   
In the end, Oportunidades‟ cash transfers amount to an average boost in income of 
around 22% for beneficiary families.
98
  A typical beneficiary family receives 342 pesos (in 2002 
values) per month, which is a significant amount when one considers that average monthly 
minimum was 1,192 pesos (in 2002 pesos) per month at that time.
99
  Prior to Oportunidades, the 
average monthly minimum wage was 1,760 (in 2002 pesos); meaning that the program‟s 
transfers represented an increase in disposable income of just over 19%.
100
  There is a great deal 
of variation in how much a family receives, depending on its characteristics and record of 
meeting conditionalities. Nonetheless, this is a sizable sum of money for poor families that 
should have an immediate and independent impact on poverty reduction in the short run (in 
addition to education, health, and nutrition outcomes over time). 
 Oportunidades is a distinctive program not only because of its hybrid strategy, but also 
because it is extremely cost effective.  Though program expenditures have risen substantially, 
from 240 million to 2.7 billion pesos due to expansion of the program, operating expenses have 
stabilized at around 6% of the budget.
101
  In other words, 94 centavos out of every peso spent on 
17 
 
Oportunidades reaches households; 82 of those centavos represent direct cash transfers and the 
remaining 12 centavos represent in kind subsidies, such as nutritional supplements.
102
  A great 
deal of this can be attributed to that fact that unlike other demand side interventions in Mexico, it 
provides cash instead of food transfers – the latter of which have been proven to be by costly 
subsidies with very high levels of benefit leakages to non-poor households.
103
  Grosh (1994) 
highlights the cost effectiveness of Oportunidades by comparing it to other programs in Mexico, 
such as Leche Industrial CONASUPO (LICONSA), that run program costs as high as 40 
centavos per peso (or 40% of its budget).
104
  As such, the amplification in the size of 
Oportunidades‟ spending appears legitimate due to the swell in the number of beneficiaries from 
thousands to millions of families. 
 The size of Oportunidades could foreshadow inefficient targeting and coverage, which 
has historically been common for other massive programs.  Nonetheless, this has not necessarily 
proven to be the case.  Some leakage from the program certainly exists; however, it appears as 
though the vast majority of Oportunidades‟ beneficiaries are those who fall under the poverty 
line.  This is illustrated by the fact that as of 2003 74% of families in highly marginalized 
communities were covered by the program, while this was only the case with 31% of families in 
moderately marginalized communities, and fewer than 5% in communities with low levels of 
marginalization.
105
   
Moreover, its coverage is higher in smaller communities, which are often poorer and 
more marginalized.
106
  For instance, Oportunidades serves 94% of families in communities with 
high to very high levels of marginalization and more than 100 inhabitants.  That being said, it 
only serves 53% of those same poor families located in communities with less than 100 
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individuals.
107
  Thus, it becomes evident that although Oportunidades‟ targeting and coverage is 
admirable, it has plenty of room for improvement, if it hopes to reach those who need it the most. 
In order to ensure that Oportunidades has a lasting impact beyond the short to medium 
term, the program has taken a number of steps to improve itself.  Aforementioned elements of its 
progression over time include changes to the education grant structure, the sizable expansion of 
its coverage, and the stabilization of its low costs.  In 2001 a rather substantial increase in the 
program‟s coverage and budget, along the programming modifications referred to earlier, 
accompanied the program‟s change of name to Oportunidades.  One additional and interesting 
factor of Oportunidades‟ progress over time has been the program‟s ability to remain non-
partisan and out of the political arena, despite numerous heated elections.
108
  Sadly, this should 
be measured an accomplishment considering the precedent for political manipulation and capture 
of social programs in the developing world (especially in Mexico).
109
 
 D. Impacts: 
 Thanks to the experimental design of the Oportunidades, a plethora of impact evaluations 
have been conducted assessing the programs outcomes.  Some of the most rigorous work has 
been conducted by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), the Mexican 
National Institute of Public Health (INSP), and the Mexican Center for Research and Advanced 
Studies in Social Anthropology.  The vast majority of the available empirical literature has 
assessed the program‟s impacts in rural areas over the short term and has found positive 
outcomes in education, health, nutrition, and consumption, despite some operational setbacks.
110
 
For example, Shultz finds that enrollment rates for children in the program who have 
completed sixth grade (and should move on to seventh grade – most of which are twelve years 
old) improved 9.4% – 12.6% for females and 7.3% for males.111  This is a promising finding 
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because the transition from primary to secondary school has been proven to be the starting point 
for when most children leave school.
112
  Not surprisingly, increases in enrollment in conjunction 
with Oportunidades have been highly related to significant reductions in children‟s labor market 
participation.
113
  Though positive education impacts are found for other periods of schooling, the 
most pronounced findings hover around the transition to seventh grade and during secondary 
school because of how high enrollment rates are in primary schools.  Consequently, Behrman, 
Sengupta, and Todd find that twelve year old children eligible to move on to secondary school 
are 6% less likely to repeat seventh grade and progress through school 11% faster as a result of 
Oportunidades.
114
  In addition, Parker finds that 14% of boys and 17.9% of girls who have 
previously dropped out of or failed third grade are more likely to stay in school as a result of the 
program.
115
 
Oportunidades‟ impact on health and nutrition has also proven robust across numerous 
indicators.  For example, Gertler finds that children between the ages of zero and five in the 
program exhibit 12% lower incidence rates of illness.
116
  Likewise, Gertler finds that young 
children in the program are nearly one centimeter taller than control children (those with similar 
characteristics in non-participating households) and 25.5% less likely to be anemic.
117
  When it 
comes to adult health, Gertler finds that beneficiaries spend 17% fewer days incapacitated, 22% 
fewer days in bed, and walk about 7% farther.
118
  Some of this can be attributed to the 
encouraging result that the demand for health services increased by 30 to 50%, depending on age 
groups, in response to the free health care options provided by Oportunidades.
119
  Lastly, 
Hernandez and Huerta conclude that the number of program beneficiaries engaged in prenatal 
care rose nearly 5% (from 84.1 to 88.9%), illustrating Oportunidades‟ positive influence on 
pregnant mothers.
120
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In terms of consumption, Oportunidades also appears to have had a substantial and 
positive effect on beneficiary households.  For instance, Hoddinott, Skoufias, and Washburn, 
find that average level of consumption increased nearly 15% for beneficiary households.
121
  It is 
particularly encouraging that in November 1999, over 10% of this increase was spent on food 
expenditures, which translated into a 7.1% increase in caloric acquisition for participants.
122
  
Most of these additional purchases have come in the form of vegetables and animal purchases, 
signifying an overall improvement in dietary quality for beneficiaries.
123
 
Though assessing Oportunidades‟ impact on poverty is difficult, numerous estimates 
convey that the program has improved the general welfare of its beneficiaries.  For example, the 
headcount poverty rate from November 1997 to November 1999 (measured according to median 
consumption as a proxy for income) fell by 17%.
124
  Moreover, the poverty gap and severity of 
poverty declined 36% and 46%, respectively, for participants during the same period.
125
  This, 
coupled with the finding that the additional education attained by children should translate into 
an 8% future increase in annual earnings, highlights Oportunidades‟ fairly robust results.126 
Though not all of program‟s interventions have been as effective as those mentioned 
above, they have for the most part contributed to the accumulation of human capital and 
improvement of welfare for Mexico‟s poorest groups.  Only time will tell if these outcomes will 
be sustained, strides will be made according to additional measures, and Oportunidades will 
contribute to breaking the vicious cycle of poverty in the long run.  Although Oportunidades has 
not yet achieved its goals, it has begun the process of “creating conditions where families would 
have more security regarding the availability of income to buy food; more information on 
hygiene, environmental and reproductive health; alternative sources of income for present 
21 
 
consumptions to enable their children to attend school more regularly and for longer periods of 
time; and a modified structure of health risks…”127 
 
3. Conceptual Framework:  
A. Human Capital Theory & Conditionality Underpinnings:
 128
 
 The human capital framework, which became quite prominent in the early 1960s, 
attempts to explain why people‟s incomes differ based on their training, amongst other factors 
like basic health.
129
  It has been rigorously tested in over 60 countries and is based on the idea 
that “if someone has more years of schooling, he or she will receive higher rewards later in life 
relative to a lesser trained person as compensation for past investment in human capital.”130  In 
the mid 1970‟s Jacob Mincer‟s landmark investigation, Schooling, Experience, and Earnings, 
solidified the relationship between earnings, education, and labor market experience in the 
U.S.A.
131
  This link is one of the key reasons why some programs in developing countries target 
increases in education or basic health as a means to alleviate future poverty.   
 Human capital theory also asserts that in most instances education is obtained at a private 
cost by families to increase a student‟s future productivity, in addition to public costs. 132  
Moreover, the decision to remain in school is “affected by the balance between the current 
opportunity cost of enrollment and the anticipated future productive gains from acquiring 
additional schooling.”133  Many policies formulated to boost education or health for the poor 
focus on improving access to quality public schools and health clinics.
134
 This increases the 
anticipated future productive gains from schooling, which helps education overcome the 
relatively high opportunity costs (shadow prices) of current enrollment.  However, many of these 
policies have ignored that such measures also necessitate complimentary private investments by 
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the household and a basic level of health.  To overcome this issue, programs such as 
Oportunidades transfer public resources directly to families (once they meet co-responsibilities) 
who then chose how to invest in their children‟s health and schooling as needed.135   
These in-kind transfers are purposely conditioned on regular school attendance and 
periodic medical visits that provide incentives for households to make additional private 
investments to increase human capital accumulation.  Empirical analyses of unconditional cash 
transfer programs have found their positive impacts on education to be marginal at best.
136
  On 
the other hand, studies have found that conditional transfers are associated with greater 
improvements in children‟s welfare than unconditioned cash grants. 137   This implies that 
unconditional income transfer programs can only have a limited effect in increasing human 
capital due to the nature of their design.
138
  In addition, there is evidence that conditioned cash 
transfer programs may be more effective in lowering the shadow price of attending school, 
increasing complimentary household investment, fostering basic health, and improving school 
enrollment rates.
139
   
However, these findings are in contrast to basic economic theory, which proposes that a 
household would be better off receiving unconditioned benefits.
140
  This theoretical perspective 
assumes that markets are fully functioning and fails to consider that household behavior deviates 
significantly in the presence of markets failures.  The trend for households in rural economies 
affected by incomplete markets and externalities is to invest less in education and health than 
what would be socially optimal; conditionalities serve as a mechanism to bridge this gap and 
improve efficiency.
141
  In other words, requiring households to meet a minimum of school 
attendance and health visit co-responsibilities results in improved human capital accumulation 
for the poor and greater social welfare for society as a whole.
142
  Thus, it becomes apparent that 
23 
 
Oportunidades‟ unique synthesis of conditional cash transfers are justified on the basis that they 
lead to greater human capital accumulation for the poor, overcome obstacles created by 
imperfect markets, and maximize social welfare gains.  
B. Underpinnings, Justifications & a Hypothesis: 
By now it is apparent that if effective, Oportunidades should have a significant impact on 
Mexico‟s marginalized indigenous populations.  After all, their educations levels are quite low: 
in 2002, 28% of children between the ages of six and fourteen living in primarily indigenous 
municipalities did not enroll in school and 32.5% of individuals older than fifteen years old did 
not know how to read and write according to the Mexican Instituto Nacional Indigenista.
143
  In 
addition, indigenous children are more likely to be overworked, exploited, and deprivation of 
their health as a consequence.
144
  However, whether or not Oportunidades‟ impact will be the 
same, lesser, or stronger on indigenous populations versus the general population (or the non-
indigenous group) is an unresolved question.  That being said, there are numerous specific 
reasons why one might expect Oportunidades‟ impact on indigenous populations to differ. 
For starters, it is possible that they will benefit more because they are starting off at a 
lower point of human capital accumulation and so their increase will be extraordinarily 
accelerated by Oportunidades.  On the other hand, it can be argued that the program is not 
adequately designed to specifically meet indigenous people‟s unique needs.   For instance, the 
cash transfers may not be sufficient to overcome the opportunity costs of sending an indigenous 
child to school or a clinic who is counted on to generate income with that time.  This is a major 
concern because indigenous parents have less formal schooling, lower earnings, and many of 
them rely on agricultural work, which is intensive and necessitates family labor.
145
  Not 
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surprisingly, households who work in agriculture have children with lower levels of human 
capital attainment.”146 
Further, indigenous populations are disproportionately concentrated in very rural areas of 
Mexico.
147
  This is a disadvantage to them because rural public schools and clinics often have 
fewer and lower quality institutional resources.
148
  Thus, the incentives for indigenous children to 
go to school or visit a doctor in very rural municipalities are diminished.  In addition, rural 
children face substantial logistical obstacles, such as having to travel up to three to four hours to 
and from larger towns where schools or health centers are located.
149
  Even if poor rural 
indigenous children do enroll in school it should also be noted that they are more likely to be 
taken out of school during times of need to work.
150
  This issue intensifies as a child ages 
because a households‟ dependence on child income increases with age; worse yet, indigenous 
children account for even larger portions of total family incomes.
151
  In addition, it should be 
highlighted that child labor forces are generally much greater in indigenous areas of Mexico.
152
   
Another issue that contributes to this problem, and the stunting of human capital 
accumulation, is the fact that indigenous children have a higher likelihood of being employed 
and out of school because of language problems and cultural differences.
153
  This may also pose 
disincentives to visit health clinics where staff can not effectively communicate with indigenous 
families, indigenous patients feel uncomfortable, and the quality of care or information 
dissemination suffers greatly.  Language complications are especially pertinent to the case of the 
indigenous poor in Mexico because they speak so many different languages that it is difficult for 
them to unify themselves with each other as a cohesive group (or the non-indigenous population) 
and overcome barriers, such as discrimination.
154
  This issue of discrimination should not be 
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underestimated; it undoubtedly plays an influential role in why indigenous populations continue 
to be marginalized.
155
 
Thus, it becomes apparent that there are numerous reasons for why the impact of 
Oportunidades may differ on indigenous people.  Certainly, others such as family size exist, but 
only the most prominent are discussed here in the interests of brevity.  It is for the 
abovementioned reasons that this study tests the hypothesis that the impact of Oportunidades on 
human capital (measured by school enrollment, progression, repeat and illness rates) will differ 
between the general beneficiary population and indigenous beneficiary population in Mexico.  
Whether this divergence will be positive or negative is hard to say.  The former is hoped for, but 
it is also obvious that the latter may be extremely likely considering the added challenges that the 
rural indigenous poor of Mexico continue to grapple with. 
 
4. Data:  
A. General Description: 
 The data used in this analysis is a panel that was constructed from five surveys starting in 
November of 1997 and ending in May of 2000.  It is particularly rich data because of its 
substantial concentration of observations in the lowest tail of the income distribution where 
indigenous populations largely reside. Thus, it will hopefully provide for fruitful analyses of 
indigenous and impoverished households.  The first survey is a Mexican household economic 
census (ENCASEH) from November 1997 that serves as the baseline for assessing 
Oportunidades.  It is primarily used to provide individual and household characteristics, as well 
as starting points for enrollment, repeat, and progression rates.  The second is an Oportunidades 
baseline follow up survey from March 1998 which provides the earliest information about illness 
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rates.  The third is a household evaluation survey (ENCEL) from October 1998 that provides 
community level information, such as the presence of schools in a locality, as well as data 
concerning enrollment, repeat, and progression rates.   
The fourth survey is an ENCEL from November 1999, conducted nearly two years after 
the program was initiated, which supplies data about enrollment, repeat, and progression 
outcomes. Lastly, an ENCEL from May 2000 is employed to provide information about illness 
outcomes.  In total, the merged data provide observations for approximately 110,000 individuals 
from 320 treatment and 186 control communities.  Whether or not a household has been treated 
is represented by a dummy variable named Participation (control = 0 and treatment = 1). 
 These data sets are merged to create two samples: one of children between the ages of 
eight and fifteen in 1997 and 1999 (to test enrollment, progression, and repeat outcomes), as well 
as one of children between the ages of zero and five in 1998 and 2000 (to test illness outcomes).  
The first data set is limited to the ages when most children are in grades three through nine, 
which are the grades Oportunidades originally offered transfers for, and yields roughly 48,000 
observations.  For the purposes of comparison, this education sample is broken down into two 
smaller sub-samples: one with children between the ages of twelve to fourteen (the age range 
when students generally transition into secondary school) and another restricted only to twelve 
year olds (the age when the greatest number of students transition). The second data set 
concentrates on younger children, when illnesses have the most serious long term consequences, 
and yields approximately 13,000 observations.  For the purposes of comparison, this illness set is 
broken down into two smaller sub-samples: children between zero and two years old versus 
children between three and five years old.  
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This collection of observations is used to assess how enrollment, repeat, progression, and 
illness rates have changed for beneficiaries as a result of Oportunidades, as well as how these 
results differ for Mexico‟s indigenous poor.  Enrollment, the dependent variable in the first test, 
is a nominal measure (no = 0 and yes = 1) representing whether or not survey respondents claim 
to currently be attending school. 
156
 Progression, the dependent variable in the third test, is a 
nominal measure defined as currently being in a grade above last year‟s.  Repeat, the dependent 
measure in the second test, is a nominal variable defined as currently being in the same grade as 
the previous year.  For progression and repeat tests, though not for enrollment regression, 
observations are dropped if a child skips more than three grades or goes backwards in grade 
level.
157
  Illness, the dependent variable, is a nominal measure indicating a mother‟s response to 
whether her (five years old or younger) child has been sick in the last four weeks. 
 Individuals are identified as being indigenous in two ways for the purpose of comparison 
when initial tests are robust.  The primary set of regressions identifies indigenous children based 
on whether or not their head of household speaks an indigenous language (Head Indigenous 
Language or Indigenous 1).
158
  Surveys obtain this information by directly asking the head of 
household if he or she speaks an indigenous language.
159
  A second more rigorous indigenous 
measure (used in this study when initial tests are statistically robust) is based on the first variable 
detailed above, but excludes heads of households who are bilingual.  In other words, it identifies 
individuals who do not speak Spanish or any other additional language (Head Only Indigenous 
Language or Indigenous 2).  This measure may prove helpful in assessing the impact of 
Oportunidades on less integrated indigenous populations.   
Additional explanatory variables, such as Household Size, Owns Cattle, Education 
Committee, are described in the following section.  If Indigenous 1 and Indigenous 2 test results 
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are statistically significant, logical, and consistent with previous studies, the heterogeneity of 
these impacts is further broken down for Indigenous 1 according to two separate specifications.  
Firstly, outcomes are taken into the gender (female = 0 and male =1) of respondents for reasons 
that will be described below.  Secondly, results are broken down for respondents who reside in 
the states of Michocan, Guerrero, and Veracruz for reasons that will be detailed later.  This 
format allows for a more comprehensive view of Oportunidades‟ indigenous heterogeneity. 
B. Control & Treatment Characteristics:  
Before running any regressions, it is important to statistically compare the means of the 
control and treatment groups to understand how each group generally sizes up and to identify 
observable (significant) differences between the two that need to be controlled.  In this case, 
three samples are considered to compare the characteristics of control and treatment groups: (i) a 
general sample of children zero to fifteen (which is an approximate baseline combination of the 
education and health samples), (ii) a sample of children eight to fifteen for three education 
factors, and (iii) a sample of children zero to five for one health factor.  This format is repeated 
in the next section to contrast indigenous and non-indigenous populations.   
The zero to fifteen sample yields approximately 32,000 observations: around 12,000 
control and 20,000 treatment observations.  The eight to fifteen sample yields roughly 23,000 
observations: about 9,000 control and 14,000 observations. The zero to five sample yields 
approximately 7,000 observations: around 2,000 control and 4,000 observations.  Table 5, found 
on the following page, demonstrates the results of numerous t-tests and illustrates the variety of 
similarities and significant differences between the groups.   
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Table 5: Treatment & Control Group Means at 1997 Baseline 
 Variables Control (C0) Treatment (T0) C0-T0 Significance 
Ages 0 to 15 Observations:  12527 19656    
   Household Data       
       Household Size 7.273 7.223 0.050 *** 
       Age 9.880 9.812 0.068 *** 
       Males 0.509 0.523 -0.014 *** 
       Head Years of Education 2.815 2.865 -0.050 ** 
       Head Literacy 0.731 0.734 -0.003  
       Head Indigenous Language 0.343 0.362 -0.019 **** 
       Head Bilingual  0.311 0.328 -0.017 **** 
       Head Only Indigenous Language 0.032 0.034 -0.002  
       Head Non-Agricultural Labor 0.263 0.284 -0.021 **** 
       Labor 3.287 3.233 0.054 **** 
       Male Labor 1.653 1.635 0.018 * 
       Owns Automobile 0.023 0.022 0.001  
       Owns Truck 0.085 0.069 -0.016 **** 
       Owns Home 0.951 0.959 -0.008 **** 
       Owns Home Lot 0.890 0.911 -0.021 **** 
       Land Used/Owned 2.339 2.261 0.079 * 
       Owns Cattle 1.131 1.064 0.067 * 
       Electricity 0.770 0.728 0.042 **** 
       Tubed Water 0.330 0.403 -0.023 **** 
 
       Earth-floor 0.600 0.605 -0.005  
       Youth Literacy 0.743 0.732 0.011 *** 
       Youth Indigenous Language 0.290 0.293 -0.003  
       Youth Bilingual 0.230 0.249 -0.019 **** 
       Youth Non Agricultural Work 0.549 0.630 -0.081 **** 
       Youth Annual Work 0.585 0.535 0.050 **** 
   Community Data     
       Marginalization Index 0.469 0.434 0.035 **** 
       Up to 25% Poor Households 0.071 0.097 -0.026 ****  
       26% to 50% Poor Households 0.486 0.351 0.135 **** 
       51% to 75% Poor Households 0.293 0.376 -0.083 **** 
       75% to 100% Poor Households  0.150   0.176  -0.026 **** 
       Education Committee 0.784 0.791 -0.007  
       Pre-school 0.826 0.840 -0.014 **** 
       Primary School 0.961 0.946 0.069 **** 
       Secondary School 0.010 0.011 -0.001  
Ages 8 to 15 Observations: 8972 14025   
   Education Data     
       Enrollment Rate 0.783 0.821 -0.038 **** 
       Repeat Rate 0.144 0.154 -0.010 *** 
       Progression Rate 0.636 0.663 -0.027 **** 
Ages 0 to 5 Observations: 2460 3923   
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   Health Data     
       Illness Rate 0.341 0.342 -0.001  
Notes:  
i) Four asterisks (****) indicate significance over 99%, three (***) indicate significance over 
95%, two (**) indicate significance over 90%, and one (*) indicates significance over 85%. 
 
Although, the magnitudes of these variations are not extremely large in nearly all 
instances, many prove to be statistically significant above a 95% or 99% level.  Thus, it becomes 
apparent that despite the randomized design of Oportunidades (which is detailed in the following 
section), a great deal of statistically powerful differences still exist between control and treatment 
groups, no matter how subtle they may seem at first.  For instance, household size and labor are 
actually larger in the control group, which is also slightly older; however, there are more males 
in the treatment group.  All of these results vary in a highly significant manner.  A head of 
household‟s years of education, often a strong indicator of children‟s education levels, is 
statistically significant above the 90% level, unlike a head of household‟s literacy or whether he 
or she only speaks an indigenous language.  There are also extremely significant differences 
between each group in regards to head of households who speak an indigenous language, are 
bilingual, or participate in non-agricultural labor.  Male labor and ownership of an automobile do 
not vary much, but ownership of a truck, home, and home lot do in a significant manner.  The 
amount of land owned/used, cattle owned, and whether a household has an earth-floor do not 
differ significantly, but access to electricity and tubed water do.
160
    Thus, it becomes evident 
that household characteristics and asset levels will need to be controlled for; otherwise they may 
drive the results to under or overestimate the effects of Oportunidades. 
For youths, highly significant differences between both groups can be found regarding 
school enrolment, repeat, and progression rates, as well as literacy, being bilingual, or engaging 
in non-agricultural work and annual work.  On the other hand, speaking an indigenous language 
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or the incidence of illness do not pose discrepancies to be concerned about.  In terms of 
community characteristics, one also finds a multitude of observable statistically significant 
variations to account for.  For instance, the control group averaged a significantly higher 
marginalization index score than the treatment group.  Moreover, the percentage of poor 
households in a community, as well as whether a locality has a pre-school of primary school, is 
quite significantly different.  On the other hand, whether a community has an education 
committee (a crude measure of social capital) or a secondary school does not vary much across 
groups. In the end, it is apparent that simply comparing control and treatment groups without 
controlling for their inherent differences would be imprudent and bias the program‟s results. 
C. Indigenous & Non-Indigenous Characteristics:  
It is also imperative to examine the characteristics of indigenous and non-indigenous 
households because they too could bias regression estimates.  Table 6 on the following page 
illustrates a somewhat analogous situation to the previous one, although in this instance there is 
more statistical divergence between the groups.  The zero to fifteen sample yields roughly 21,000 
non-indigenous and 11,000 indigenous observations (according to Indigenous 1).  The eight to 
fifteen sample yields approximately 15,000 non-indigenous and 3,000 indigenous observations.  
The zero to five sample yields around 4,000 non-indigenous and 2,000 indigenous observations.  
To start, it is apparent that participation in Oportunidades is significantly greater for the 
indigenous group at a 99% significance level.  This may be because there are more poor 
indigenous communities or indigenous take-up rates are higher, as well as because of 
administrative targeting and implementation issues. 
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Table 6: Indigenous & Non-Indigenous Group Means at 1997 Baseline 
 Variables Non-Indigenous (I0) Indigenous (I1) I0-I1 Significance 
Ages 0 to 15 Observations:  20764 11419   
   Household Data      
       Participation in Oportunidades 0.604 0.623 -0.019 **** 
       Household Size 7.267 7.198 0.069 **** 
       Age 9.907 9.716 0.191 **** 
       Males 0.513 0.526 -0.013 *** 
       Head Years of Education 2.815 2.901 -0.086 **** 
       Head Literacy 0.766 0.674 0.092 **** 
       Head Bilingual 0.000 0.906 -0.906 **** 
       Head Only Indigenous Language 0.000 0.094 -0.094 **** 
       Head Non-Agricultural Labor 0.289 0.251 0.038 **** 
       Labor 3.300 3.171 0.129 **** 
       Male Labor 1.670 1.591 0.079 **** 
       Owns Automobile 0.032 0.007 0.025 **** 
       Owns Truck 0.103 0.026 0.077 *** 
       Owns Home 0.945 0.975 -0.030 **** 
       Owns Home Lot 0.890 0.926 -0.036 **** 
       Land Used/Owned 2.368 2.152 0.214 **** 
       Owns Cattle 1.366 0.589 0.777 **** 
       Electricity 0.799 0.646 0.153 **** 
       Tubed Water 0.454 0.230 0.224 **** 
       Earth-floor 0.503 0.783 -0.280 **** 
       Youth Literacy 0.758 0.696 0.062 **** 
       Youth Indigenous Language 0.002 0.817 -0.815 **** 
       Youth Bilingual 0.002 0.676 -0.674 **** 
       Youth Non-Agricultural Work 0.642 0.510 0.132 **** 
       Youth Annual Work 0.553 0.550 0.003  
   Community Data      
       Marginalization Index 0.186 0.923 -0.736 **** 
       Up to 25% Poor Households 0.106 0.052 0.054 **** 
       26% to 50% Poor Households 0.535 0.165 0.370 **** 
       51% to 75% Poor Households 0.282 0.455 -0.173 **** 
       75% to 100% Poor Households 0.077 0.328 -0.251 **** 
       Education Committee 0.780 0.803 -0.023 **** 
       Preschool 0.829 0.845 -0.016 **** 
       Primary School 0.960 0.935 0.025 **** 
       Secondary School 0.009 0.012 -0.003 *** 
Ages 8 to 15 Observations: 15004 7993   
   Education Data     
       Enrollment Rate 0.859 0.884 -0.025 **** 
       Repeat Rate 0.217 0.254 -0.037 **** 
       Progression Rate 0.641 0.628 0.013 ** 
Ages 0 to 5 Observations: 4017  2366    
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   Health Data     
       Illness Rate 0.343 0.341 0.001  
Notes:  
i) Four asterisks (****) indicate significance over 99%, three (***) indicate significance over 
95%, two (**) indicate significance over 90%, and one (*) indicates significance over 85%. 
 
Household size is still statistically significant, although indigenous households are now 
smaller. The discrepancies in household size, age, and males are also quite statistically 
significant.  Furthermore, variations in reference to a head of household‟s years of education, 
literacy, bilingualism, and non-agricultural employment are significantly different above a 99% 
level.  It is particularly interesting that the indigenous group exhibits a higher mean head of 
household‟s years of education than the non-indigenous group.  This is contrary to the theory 
provided earlier, but may be due to the fact that both populations are so poor that the typically 
wide indigenous education and poverty gap may not hold true.  The remaining labor 
characteristics are also extremely significant and do not pose any particular surprises, though 
they too will need to be accounted for. 
 Moving on to the variables that deal with ownership, capital accumulation, and 
access to services, one finds that almost all of them are significantly different at a 99% level.  
The non-indigenous population is more likely to own an automobile, truck, land, and cattle, or 
have electricity and tubed water in their home.  It is noteworthy that the non-indigenous 
households, on average, own almost one more cow than the non-indigenous households.  On the 
other hand, households in the indigenous group are more likely to own their home and home lot 
or have a dirt earth-floor.  This pattern can be partially explained because indigenous households 
typically live in more rural areas that lack access to credit and mechanized transportation.  As a 
result, they are often more attached to their family dwellings, land or traditional (distinct) culture; 
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though, this is certainly only part of the story.  Either way these discrepancies will need to be 
controlled for.   
In terms of youth variables it is apparent that significant differences exist between both 
groups in relation to literacy, languages, and non-agricultural work, but not annual work.  
enrollment rates are about 3% higher for the indigenous group, however, progression and repeat 
rates are all lower for the indigenous group and significant above a 90% level.  On the other hand, 
illness is once again consistently similar across the board.  This may simply illustrate that 
indigenous households find sending their children to school more appealing, if they can bear 
costs, because they have few other options of providing valuable future opportunities for their 
children. 
Indigenous communities come out to be enormously and significantly more marginalized 
than non-indigenous localities.  In fact, indigenous households live in localities that are nearly 
five times as marginalized as those where non-indigenous households reside.  This is supported 
by the finding that non-indigenous communities generally have fewer poor households; they are 
highly concentrated in communities made up of 0 to 50% poor households, while indigenous 
households are decidedly concentrated in localities consisting of 51 to 100% poor households.  
All of these comparisons are significant, which reinforces the view that the indigenous group 
appears to be much more impoverished.  Lastly, education committees, pre-schools, and 
secondary schools appear more likely in indigenous areas, while primary schools are less 
common.   
In the end, the two abovementioned comparisons make it clear that a wide variety of 
observable factors must be accounted for when assessing Oportunidades‟ impact on indigenous 
populations; otherwise this analysis will be inherently skewed.  The exact list of variables 
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included in regressions as control variables is detailed in the following section.  Table 5 
demonstrated the statistical differences between control and treatment groups.  In addition, Table 
6 is of particular interest because it illustrated that the indigenous are more disadvantaged in a 
multitude of ways, though this does not unilaterally hold true.  This outcome is quite possibly 
explained by the concentration of this data amongst the poorest of the poor.  Consequently, some 
differences between highly disadvantaged populations, indigenous or non-indigenous, likely melt 
away as the challenges associated with abject poverty become overwhelming. 
 
5. Empirical Methodology:
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 The random design of this program and the panel form of this data are two features that 
facilitate impact assessments by minimizing numerous econometric pitfalls and statistical 
concerns.  Oportunidades intentionally adhered to an experimental design from its inception, 
which allows for the comparison of impacts between treatment and control groups.
162
  This is 
possible because the program was randomly implemented in a limited number of eligible 
communities due to budgetary constraints.
163
  As a result, eligible communities awaiting 
inclusion into Oportunidades serve as a control group up until the point when they are 
incorporated in the following years.  Furthermore, this data set contains repeated observations for 
the same control and treatment households before and after the program was implemented.
164
  
For example, a sample of 24,000 families from 506 communities was regularly interviewed 
between 1997 and 1999 in the seven states where Oportunidades was initially launched.
165
  Each 
time the program has expanded, it has made efforts to maintain its experimental design and 
repeatedly survey consistent (or extremely similar) samples of the population to facilitate future 
impact assessments. 
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As a result, it is possible to straightforwardly estimate program effects via a difference-
in-difference or double difference method.
166
  This approach is then extended one step to 
highlight Oportunidades‟ impact on indigenous populations.  In essence, these differentiated 
results are estimated via a triple difference approach.  The double difference approach provides 
the average program impact by taking into account the differences across time and across control 
and treatment groups.  In theory, the double difference approach controls for the effects of 
observed differences between groups over time and all time invariant unobserved characteristics.  
This method is illustrated in Table 7 and its estimation equation found below: 
Table 7: Double Difference Approach 
 Treatment Group (T) Control Group (T) Difference Across Groups 
Follow Up (1 = 1999) T1 C1 T1-T0 
Baseline (0 = 1997) T0 C0 C1-C0 
Difference Across Time T1 – T0  C1 – C0 (T1-T0)-(C1-C0) 
 
(1) Eict = α0 + α1 Yt + α2 Pc + δ1 Yt Pc + (µi + νict), 
Eict is the outcome variable (enrollment, progression, repeat, or illness rates in this case), 
Yt represents time, Pc represents participation in Oportunidades, Yt Pc represents the interaction 
between participation in the program and time, (µi + νict) represents controls for observed and 
unobserved household time invariant factors and time variant errors (respectively), α‟s represent 
unknown parameters, and δ1 represents the double difference impact.  Next is the augmented 
triple difference equation (differentiated by indigenousness): 
(2) Eict = α0 + α1 Yt + α2 Kc + α3 Pc + α4 Yt Kc + α5 Kc Pc + δ2 Yt Pc + δ3 Yt Pc Kc + (µc + µi + νict) 
The equation above follows the same form, but adds in Kc to represent being indigenous, 
α4 Yt Kc represents the interaction between time and being indigenous, α5 Kc Pc represents the 
interaction between being indigenous and participating in Oportunidades, Yt Pc Kc represents the 
interaction between time, participation in the program, and being indigenous, (µc + µi + νict) 
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represents controls for observed and unobserved household and indigenous time invariant factors, 
as well as time variant errors (respectively), and finally δ3 represents the triple difference 
indigenous effect.  Thus, the total estimated program effect for indigenous people is δ2 +δ3 from 
the second equation.   
To be clear, (µc + µi + νict) are the controls identified in the previous section that account 
for the statistically significant time variant and invariant differences between control and 
treatment groups, as well as indigenous and non-indigenous groups.  In other words, the 
following is a list of variables included to control for observable differences: Household Size, 
Age, Male (gender), Head Years of Education, Total Land Used/Owned, Owns Cattle, Electricity, 
Earth-floor, Marginalization Index, Education Committee, Secondary School, and state dummy 
variables.
167
  They are all included because they were significantly different in one of the 
aforementioned comparisons, varied in both, or measure (directly or as a proxy) an important 
asset (or category) that could influence the dependent variable.  Youth human capital indicators 
are not incorporated because they are a function of human capital accumulation in the first place.  
Similarly, youth work indicators are omitted because in this context the decisions to work or go 
to school are non-separable, thus, their inherent relationship could lead to endogeneity issues. 
 
6. Results: 
As mentioned earlier, regressions are run for four key indicators of human capital – 
enrollment, progression, repeat, and illness rates.  In each case, double and triple difference 
regressions are run with and without control variables to assess the impacts of Oportunidades on 
the general beneficiary population and indigenous beneficiary population.  This format is 
intended to account for observable influences and to illustrate when they make a substantial 
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difference in the final estimations.  Tests are run for a variety of age groups to identify the time 
in children‟s lives when Oportunidades‟ impacts are strongest.  For example, education 
regressions (enrollment, progression, and repeat rates) begin by testing children between the ages 
of eight and fifteen, then youths between the ages of twelve and fourteen, and lastly only twelve 
year old children.  Illness rates are initially tested for children between the ages of zero and five, 
then three to five years old youths, and finally children under the age of three. 
These regressions are firstly run using the Indigenous 1 identifier.  Secondly, if 
Indigenous 1 estimations appear sound, then the same set of tests are run using the Indigenous 2 
identifier.  Additionally, if all of those results appear sound and consistent, then Indigenous 1 
results are broken down according to gender.  Comparing Oportunidades‟ results for females and 
males is important, especially for education indicators, because females typically attain less 
schooling than their male counterparts.
168
   
Lastly, if the previous tests are regarded as robust, then Indigenous 1 estimations are 
broken down across three states: Michocan, Guerrero, and Veracruz.  These areas are chosen 
because Michocan is the least indigenous state in the sample, according to the number of 
indigenous individuals (Indigenous 1) in the data set, while Guerrero and Veracruz are the most 
indigenous states.  Less than 1% of observations in Michocan are identified as indigenous, while 
this is the case for nearly 59% of observations in Guerrero and almost 61% of observations in 
Veracruz.  Comparing Michocan, Guerrero, and Veracruz estimations provide a final way to 
confirm whether or not outcomes vary according to indigenousness and a method to consider 
whether they fluctuate considerably due to state differences.  Every regression is run as a probit 
and all findings are reported according to marginal effects (dprobit). 
 
39 
 
A. Enrollment Rates: 
Before beginning it is useful to point out that the particular coefficients of interests in 
these regressions, which are reported via numerous tables found below, are the double difference 
(DD) and triple difference (DDD) estimations.  Table 8 (below) for eight to fifteen year-olds 
illustrates that Oportunidades‟ impact on enrollment for the general beneficiary population (DD) 
hovers around a 3.5% increase, regardless of controls and indigenous identifiers.  These findings 
are statistically significant above the 99% level, which provides a great deal of confidence 
concerning Oportunidades‟ advantageous impact on enrollment.  However, Table 8 also points 
out that Oportunidades‟ impact on the indigenous group (DDD) is not unique.  This is evidenced 
by that fact that none of the triple difference estimators are even remotely statistically significant.  
Thus, their noticeably smaller magnitudes, which do imply different and lesser impacts for the 
indigenous beneficiary group, are not robust and can not be accepted with confidence. 
Table 8: Ages 8 to 15 Indigenous Enrollment Triple Difference Results 
Variables: Indigenous 1  
No Controls 
Indigenous 1 
Controls 
Indigenous 2 
No Controls 
Indigenous 2 
Controls 
Observations:  48509 48509 48509 48509 
Time                                                  (Coefficient)                                                     0.0081 0.0166**** 0.0101** 0.0201**** 
                                                                (P-Score)                        (0.199) (0.001) (0.059) (0.000) 
Indigenous Identifier 0.0387**** 0.0338**** -0.0732**** -0.0381*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.041) 
Participation 0.0104** 0.0094*** 0.0114*** 0.0124**** 
 (0.075) (0.049) (0.021) (0.003) 
Time • Indigenous Identifier 0.0117 0.0186*** 0.0529*** 0.0578**** 
 (0.292) (0.039) (0.036) (0.001) 
Indigenous Identifier • Participation -0.0055 -0.0012 -0.0431* -0.0217 
 (0.597) (0.895) (0.103) (0.327) 
Time • Participation                                      (DD) 0.0346**** 0.0344**** 0.0374**** 0.0342**** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Time • Participation • Indigenous              (DDD) 0.0134 0.0006 0.0151 -0.0081 
 (0.352) (0.963) (0.667) (0.794) 
Notes:  
i) Four asterisks (****) indicate significance over 99%, three (***) indicate significance over 
95%, two (**) indicate significance over 90%, and one (*) indicates significance over 85%. 
ii) Control variable outcomes are not reported in the interests of brevity; nonetheless, they are 
available in the appendix. 
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 The estimates for a similar test on twelve to fourteen year-olds, the age range when many 
Mexican children drop out of school instead of staying on track and transitioning to secondary 
school, can be found in Table 9 found below.  It shows that Oportunidades‟ impact on the 
general beneficiary population (DD) is highly significant for all tests.  However, the magnitudes 
of the enrollment increases vary from 4.5 to nearly 6%, depending on controls and 
indigenousness.  This swell in Oportunidades‟ effect makes sense considering that school 
enrollment rates start off lower for twelve to fourteen year-olds than for eight to fifteen year-olds.  
It is interesting to note that in both instances disregarding control variables would have 
underestimated the program‟s impact.   
Table 9: Ages 12 to 14 Indigenous Enrollment Triple Difference Results 
 
Variables 
Indigenous 1  
No Controls 
Indigenous 1 
Controls 
Indigenous 2 
No Controls 
Indigenous 2 
Controls 
Observations: 18141 18141 18141 18141 
Time                                                  (Coefficient)                                                     0.0350**** 0.0402**** 0.0298**** 0.0336**** 
                                                                (P-Score)                        (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) 
Indigenous Identifier 0.0743**** 0.0889**** -0.0671** -0.0212 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.086) (0.567) 
Participation 0.0128 0.0134 0.0110*** 0.0125 
 (0.240) (0.215) (0.237) (0.177) 
Time • Indigenous Identifier -0.0101 -0.0089 0.0893** 0.1006*** 
 (0.637) (0.677) (0.057) (0.022) 
Indigenous Identifier • Participation -0.0192 -0.0172 -0.0496 -0.0183 
 (0.333) (0.382) (0.314) (0.694) 
Time • Participation                                      (DD) 0.0444**** 0.0498**** 0.0530**** 0.0585**** 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Time • Participation • Indigenous              (DDD) 0.0335 0.0291 -0.0063 -0.0491 
 (0.212) (0.272) (0.928) (0.487) 
Notes:  
i) Four asterisks (****) indicate significance over 99%, three (***) indicate significance over 
95%, two (**) indicate significance over 90%, and one (*) indicates significance over 85%. 
ii) Control variable outcomes are not reported in the interests of brevity; nonetheless, they are 
available in the appendix. 
 
 Additionally, one finds that Oportunidades‟ impact on enrollment rises by almost one full 
percentage point for Indigenous 2 tests (DD).  This suggests that controlling for heads of 
households who only speak an indigenous language notably boosts Oportunidades‟ impact on 
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enrollment rates during the transition to secondary school.  More importantly, the lack of 
statistical significance in Table 9‟s triple difference estimations (DDD) proposes that indigenous 
beneficiaries who only speak an indigenous language do not benefit more or less from 
Oportunidades than average beneficiaries.  Though the magnitude of benefits accruing to 
indigenous beneficiaries appears smaller, their lack of robustness makes it difficult to confidently 
draw conclusions – especially for the Indigenous 2 results, which turn out negative in magnitude 
and much more statistically insignificant.  
 Next, the same set of regressions are run strictly for twelve year olds, the age when the 
majority of children transition and, not surprisingly, when Shultz finds Oportunidades‟ most 
pronounced effects on enrollment (as mentioned above).  Table 10 on the following page 
provides double difference estimates (DD) of Oportunidades‟ impact that fluctuate from 
enrollment increases of 5.5 to 7%, depending on controls and indigenousness.  All of these 
outcomes are statistically significant above the 99% level.  Although these findings are not quite 
as large as Shultz‟s, the relatively similar magnitude of these estimates appears logical 
considering unresolved sample size differences and potential variable definition discrepancies.  
This consistency provides added confidence concerning the robustness of these enrollment 
boosts.   
In this case, it is also noteworthy that the inclusion of control variables avoids an over-
estimation of Oportunidades‟ impacts.  In addition, it is evident that for twelve year olds 
Indigenous 2 tests actually decrease the program‟s results.  In other words, controlling for heads 
of households who only speak an indigenous language dampens Oportunidades‟ enrollment 
boost at age twelve, which is contrary to the estimate for the aforementioned age twelve to 
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fourteen range.  This may be the situation because a critical mass of the twelve to fourteen year-
olds leaving school actually dropout at age twelve, regardless of the program. 
Table 10: Age 12 Indigenous Enrollment Triple Difference Results 
 
Variables 
Indigenous 1  
No Controls 
Indigenous 1 
Controls 
Indigenous 2 
No Controls 
Indigenous 2 
Controls 
Observations: 6425  6425  6425  6425 
Time                                                  (Coefficient)                                                     0.0079 0.0099 0.0103 0.0128 
                                                                (P-Score)                        (0.615) (0.513) (0.442) (0.326) 
Indigenous Identifier 0.0237 0.0457*** -0.1395**** -0.0545 
 (0.231) (0.022) (0.010) (0.229) 
Participation -0.0095 -0.0035 -0.0080 -0.0012 
 (0.501) (0.799) (0.504) (0.917) 
Time • Indigenous Identifier 0.0219 0.0200 0.0889** 0.0794** 
 (0.425) (0.449) (0.062) (0.086) 
Indigenous Identifier • Participation 0.0069 0.0013 0.0145 -0.0004 
 (0.785) (0.958) (0.793) (0.994) 
Time • Participation                                      (DD) 0.0710**** 0.0666**** 0.0602**** 0.0568**** 
 (0.000 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Time • Participation • Indigenous              (DDD) -0.0479 -0.0404 -0.0355 -0.0125 
 (0.234) (0.294) (0.707) (0.884) 
Notes:  
i) Four asterisks (****) indicate significance over 99%, three (***) indicate significance over 
95%, two (**) indicate significance over 90%, and one (*) indicates significance over 85%. 
ii) Control variable outcomes are not reported in the interests of brevity; nonetheless, they are 
available in the appendix. 
 
 
Moreover, Table 10 illustrates that triple difference estimates (DDD) are statistically 
insignificant, suggesting a lack of program impact variation.  Magnitudes appear consistently 
negative suggesting a disadvantageous outcome at this specific age for twelve year old 
indigenous beneficiary children, especially for those whose parents do not speak Spanish.  
Nonetheless, little trust can be put in some of these results because of their lack of statistical 
robustness.  Consequently, all of the results mentioned above, regardless of age, controls, and 
indigenousness, signify that one can soundly reject the enrollment component of this study’s 
hypothesis: the impact of Oportunidades on school enrollment does not differ for indigenous 
populations in Mexico when compared to the program’s average affect on general beneficiaries. 
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 Considering Indigenous 1 impact estimates according to gender also implies that the 
enrollment component of this study‟s hypothesis should also rejected.  In all three age range 
instances, Table 11 on the following page shows that double difference estimates (DD) appear 
highly significant and reasonable considering the aforementioned results; while triple difference 
estimates (DDD) appear lower in magnitude, but extremely insignificant.  Neither indigenous 
males nor indigenous females benefit more or less from Oportunidades than general beneficiaries.  
In other words, these results confirm previous findings concerning enrollment increases and 
provide added confidence to reject the study‟s enrollment hypothesis.   
 Table 11 also demonstrates that enrollment impacts differentiated by gender vary 
considerably.  Oportunidades‟ average impact (DD) on eight to fifteen year-olds reflects a 3.25% 
increase in enrollment for females and a 3.63% boost for males at highly significant levels.    
However, the twelve to fourteen group provides evidence that females (7.04%) benefit over 
double that of males (3.13%).  That being said, it should be noted that the female estimate is 
considerably more significant than the male one.   
Furthermore, the twelve year-old group illustrates that Oportunidades leads to a female 
enrollment rate boost of 9.48%, which more than doubles the program‟s impact on twelve year 
old males (4.11%).  Both of these findings are statistically significant above the 90% level.  This 
is the point in a child‟s life when enrollment rate changes are greatest for females and males, 
which is consistent (though smaller in magnitude) with Shultz‟s findings.169  Thus, it is clear that 
as children get closer to the transition between primary and secondary school, females benefit 
more from the program.  In addition, it is apparent that Oportunidades‟ enrollment rate boosts do 
not differ for the indigenous population due to gender differences. 
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Table 11: Female & Male Indigenous Enrollment Triple Difference Results 
 
 
Variables 
Female 
Indigenous 1 
Controls 
Male 
Indigenous 1 
Controls 
Ages 8 to 15 Observations: 23477 25032 
Time                                                  (Coefficient)                                                     0.0288**** 0.0056
                                                                (P-Score)                        (0.000) (0.420) 
Indigenous Identifier 0.0273**** 0.0390**** 
 (0.008) (0.000) 
Participation 0.0070 0.0116** 
 (0.319) (0.077) 
Time • Indigenous Identifier 0.0114 0.0257*** 
 (0.397) (0.033) 
Indigenous Identifier • Participation 0.0008 -0.0030 
 (0.949) (0.802) 
Time • Participation                                      (DD) 0.0325**** 0.0363**** 
 (0.001) (0.000) 
Time • Participation • Indigenous              (DDD) 0.0105 -0.0097 
 (0.552) (0.752) 
Ages 12 to 14: 8635 9506 
Time                                                  (Coefficient)                                                     0.0553**** 0.0271**
                                                                (P-Score)                        (0.002) (0.077) 
Indigenous Identifier 0.0956**** 0.0824**** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Participation 0.0036 0.0245** 
 (0.829) (0.084) 
Time • Indigenous Identifier -0.0385 0.0198 
 (0.240) (0.467) 
Indigenous Identifier • Participation -0.0270 -0.0101 
 (0.373) (0.692) 
Time • Participation                                      (DD) 0.0704**** 0.0313* 
 (0.002) (0.108) 
Time • Participation • Indigenous              (DDD) 0.0459 0.0114 
 (0.250) (0.748) 
Ages 12 Observations: 3051 3369 
Time                                                  (Coefficient)                                                     0.0006 0.0185
                                                                (P-Score)                        (0.980) (0.311) 
Indigenous Identifier 0.0389 0.0510*** 
 (0.248) (0.025) 
Participation -0.0344* 0.0252* 
 (0.128) (0.131) 
Time • Indigenous Identifier 0.0287 0.0113 
 (0.501) (0.729) 
Indigenous Identifier • Participation 0.0178 -0.0153 
 (0.656) (0.614) 
Time • Participation                                      (DD) 0.0948**** 0.0411** 
 (0.002) (0.075) 
Time • Participation • Indigenous              (DDD) -0.0703 -0.0104 
 (0.265) (0.818) 
Notes:  
i) Four asterisks (****) indicate significance over 99%, three (***) indicate significance over 
95%, two (**) indicate significance over 90%, and one (*) indicates significance over 85%.
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 Lastly, a comparison of Indigenous 1 double and triple difference results across 
Michocan, Guerrero, and Veracruz can be found in Table 12 on the following page.  State tests 
across all three age ranges produce ambiguous results due to a lack of consistent statistical 
significance and magnitudes.  In Michocan, the state with the smallest proportion of indigenous 
observations, it appears as though Oportunidades has a statistically significant average effect 
(DD) of 3.2% on the eight to fifteen year-old range.  Its impacts are very significant, though 
stronger in magnitude, for indigenous beneficiaries (DDD) of the same range.  Results for the 
twelve to fourteen year-old group follows the same pattern, though the average program effect 
(DD) is a slightly significant enrollment increase of 4.54%.  Twelve year-olds in Michocan 
appear to benefit the most from Oportunidades (DD), 6.5% at a highly statistically significant 
level, which is consistent with previous findings.  More importantly, indigenous beneficiaries 
once again do not appear to experience different results from the general beneficiary population, 
as evidenced by the low statistical significance of the triple difference estimator (DDD). 
In Guerrero, one of the most indigenous states in this data set, both double and triple 
difference impacts are insignificant for the twelve to fourteen year-old range and twelve year-old 
group.  In the case of the eight to fifteen year-olds, enrollment rates increased as a result of 
Oportunidades by 14.28% for the general beneficiary group (DD) at a highly significant level, 
while they decreased by 19.69% for the indigenous beneficiary group (DDD) at an equally 
robust level.  This result suggests that there is in fact an enormous difference between the two 
groups.  However, the extensive magnitudes of divergent change are a sign that there may be 
another influential factor at play in Michocan‟s education system (or that regressions‟ 
specifications may need to be reviewed).   
 
46 
 
Table 12 Michocan, Guerrero & Veracruz Indigenous Enrollment Triple Difference Results 
 
 
Variables 
Michocan 
Indigenous 1 
Controls 
Guerrero 
Indigenous 1 
Controls 
Veracruz 
Indigenous 1 
Controls 
Ages 8 to 15 Observations: 6397 3806 12590 
Time                                               (Coefficient)                                                     0.0338**** -0.0571 0.0142* 
                                                            (P-Score)                        (0.007) (0.327) (0.138) 
Indigenous Identifier -0.1548 0.0505 0.0589**** 
 (0.191) (0.298) (0.000) 
Participation 0.0331**** 0.0310 0.0083 
 (0.006) (0.504) (0.409) 
Time • Indigenous Identifier -0.0433 0.1682**** 0.0125 
 (0.736) (0.002) (0.339) 
Indigenous Identifier • Participation 0.0824 -0.0147 0.0127 
 (0.314) (0.772) (0.349) 
Time • Participation                                   (DD) 0.0320*** 0.1428*** 0.0356**** 
 (0.042) (0.013) (0.006) 
Time • Participation • Indigenous           (DDD) 0.0820 -0.1969*** -0.0203 
 (0.498) (0.020) (0.323) 
Ages 12 to 14 Observations: 4727 1384 2459 
Time                                               (Coefficient)                                                     0.0318 0.0378 0.0402* 
                                                            (P-Score)                        (0.153) (0.746) (0.154) 
Indigenous Identifier 0.1071**** 0.1817** -0.1688 
 (0.000) (0.073) (0.472) 
Participation 0.0119 0.1587* 0.0713**** 
 (0.611) (0.108) (0.007) 
Time • Indigenous Identifier -0.0082 0.1633 -0.1278 
 (0.789) (0.168) (0.730) 
Indigenous Identifier • Participation 0.0320 -0.0759 0.1865 
 (0.304) (0.482) (0.384) 
Time • Participation                                   (DD) 0.0454* 0.0796 0.0651** 
 (0.149) (0.508) (0.075) 
Time • Participation • Indigenous           (DDD) -0.0052 -0.1752 -0.0487 
 (0.908) (0.252) (0.914) 
Age 12 Observations: 2459 467 1675 
Time                                               (Coefficient)                                                     0.0402* 0.1729 0.0558 
                                                            (P-Score)                        (0.154) (0.330) (0.038)*** 
Indigenous Identifier -0.1688 0.1562 0.0901**** 
 (0.472) (0.251) (0.002) 
Participation 0.0713*** 0.0964 0.0110 
 (0.007) (0.455) (0.669) 
Time • Indigenous Identifier -0.1278 0.0115 -0.0306 
 (0.730) (0.953) (0.428) 
Indigenous Identifier • Participation 0.1865** -0.0736 0.0257 
 (0.384) (0.606) (0.462) 
Time • Participation                                   (DD) 0.0651** -0.0599 0.0501 
 (0.075) (0.761) (0.173) 
Time • Participation • Indigenous           (DDD) -0.0487 -0.0195 -0.0625 
 (0.914) (0.928) (0.327) 
Notes:  
i) Four asterisks (****) indicate significance over 99%, three (***) indicate significance over 
95%, two (**) indicate significance over 90%, and one (*) indicates significance over 85%.
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In Veracruz, the state with the highest proportion of indigenous observations, double and 
triple difference estimates are also insignificant for the twelve to fourteen year-old and twelve 
year-old groups.  However, Oportunidades‟ average program effects (DD) for the eight to fifteen 
year-old range reflect a statistically significant 3.20% increase in enrollment rates.  On the other 
hand, indigenous program impacts (DDD) turn out to be extremely statistically insignificant.  In 
the end, this mix of results across states does not provide ample evidence to support the 
enrollment component of study‟s hypothesis, though more investigation should be done to 
explain Michocan‟s unique results.  Thus, it can be concluded that Oportunidades impacts do not 
differ due to indigenousness: this study’s enrollment hypothesis can be rejected.  These findings 
also illustrate that Oportunidades‟ impacts may in fact differ substantially across states, a result 
that should motivate future research on the program‟s results. 
B. Progression & Repeat Rates: 
Table 13 on the following page provides the Indigenous 1 progression and repeat test 
results for children in all three ages groups.  It illustrates that Oportunidades had an extremely 
miniscule positive effect on progression rates of general beneficiaries (DD) for all age ranges, 
which are statistically insignificant regardless of controls.  These results, which seem unlikely 
considering the well proven increase in enrollment rates, are contrary to Behrman, Sengupta, and 
Todd‟s aforementioned findings.  This dissimilarity may stem from differences in sample size, 
the model relied on, or variable definitions.   Yet, the fact that these estimates are so far off 
suggest that there may be an influential specification issue that needs to be revisited.
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  Table 13 
provides similarly insignificant small impacts for Oportunidades‟ indigenous beneficiaries 
(DDD).  Thus, it appears as though the program has a comparable progression impact on 
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indigenous and general beneficiaries, regardless of the questionable nature of the average 
program impact results found here. 
Table 13: Indigenous Progression Triple Difference Results 
 
Variables 
Indigenous 1  
No Controls 
Indigenous 1 
Controls 
Ages 8 to 15 Observations: 37533 37533 
Time                                                  (Coefficient)                                                     -0.2840e -4**** -0.3410e -4**** 
                                                                (P-Score)                        (0.000) (0.000) 
Indigenous Identifier 0.0351**** 0.0613**** 
 (0.002) (0.000) 
Participation 0.0211*** 0.0282**** 
 (0.012) (0.001) 
Time • Indigenous Identifier -0.1740e -4*** -0.2040e -4*** 
 (0.033) (0.013) 
Indigenous Identifier • Participation 0.0202 0.0099 
 (0.161) (0.502) 
Time • Participation                                      (DD) 0.0578e -4 0.0590e -4 
 (0.338) (0.329) 
Time • Participation • Indigenous              (DDD) 0.0212e -4 0.0140e -4 
 (0.839) (0.891) 
 
Ages 12 to 14 Observations: 
13472 
Observations 
13472 
Observations 
Time                                                  (Coefficient)                                                     -0.4780e -4**** 0.5240e -4**** 
                                                                (P-Score)                        (0.000) (0.000) 
Indigenous Identifier 0.0430*** 0.0616**** 
 (0.024) (0.002) 
Participation 0.0305*** 0.0349*** 
 (0.031) (0.016) 
Time • Indigenous Identifier -0.4550e -4 -0.0470 e-4 
 (0.749) (0.744) 
Indigenous Identifier • Participation 0.0774 0.0305 
 (0.257) (0.218) 
Time • Participation                                      (DD) -0.0159e -4 0.0200e -4 
 (0.877) (0.848) 
Time • Participation • Indigenous              (DDD) -0.0714e -4 0.0880e -4 
 (0.694) (0.633) 
 
Age 12 Observations: 
14961 
Observations 
4961 
Observations 
Time                                                  (Coefficient)                                                     -0.400e -4**** -0.4060e -4**** 
                                                                (P-Score)                        (0.001) (0.001) 
Indigenous Identifier 0.0125 0.0290 
 (0.672) (0.356) 
Participation 0.0358* 0.0391** 
 (0.118) (0.090) 
Time • Indigenous Identifier -0.2020e -4 -0.1930e -4 
 (0.347) (0.368) 
Indigenous Identifier • Participation -0.0157 -0.0103 
 (0.685) (0.790) 
Time • Participation                                      (DD) -0.0664e -4 -0.0540e -4 
 (0.677) (0.738) 
Time • Participation • Indigenous              (DDD) 0.154e -4 0.0990e -4 
 (0.576) (0.720) 
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Notes:  
i) Four asterisks (****) indicate significance over 99%, three (***) indicate significance over 
95%, two (**) indicate significance over 90%, and one (*) indicates significance over 85%. 
ii) Control variable outcomes are not reported in the interests of brevity; nonetheless, they are 
available in the appendix. 
 
When it comes to repeat rates, Table 14 on the following page illustrates somewhat 
parallel findings for all three age ranges.  The magnitude of Oportunidades‟ appears to reduce 
repeat rates for the general beneficiary population (DD) in an extremely small manner.  In this 
case double difference estimates are at least 90 to 95% statistically significant across the board, 
which should provide confidence concerning these findings.  However, these results are also 
debatable considering that Behrman, Sengupta, and Todd find that Oportunidades has a much 
larger and advantageous effect on repeat rates (as previously mentioned).  Such a discrepancy, 
much like the one above, calls these results into question.  This inconsistency is also probably 
due to differences in the sample size, the model used, definitions of variables, or a 
misspecification. 
In addition, Table 14‟s triple difference estimates (DDD), all of which are highly 
insignificant and extremely small, indicate that Oportunidades had a consistent impact on repeat 
rates, regardless of indigenousness.  Although these tests can not be held with nearly the same 
degree of confidence as those for enrolment rates (because of their lack of robustness and 
inconsistency with the existent literature), they do suggest that the repeat and progression 
elements of this study’s hypothesis can be rejected.  Progression and repeat estimates do not 
provide any evidence in support of the hypothesis that Oportunidades’ impacts differ between 
general beneficiary and indigenous beneficiary groups.
173
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Table 14: Indigenous Repeat Triple Difference Results 
 
Variables 
Indigenous 1  
No Controls 
Indigenous 1 
Controls 
Ages 8 to 15 Observations: 37533 37533 
Time                                                  (Coefficient)                                                     0.3030e -4**** -0.2790e -4**** 
                                                                (P-Score)                        (0.000) (0.000) 
Indigenous Identifier 0.0179*** -0.0045 
 (0.061) (0.651) 
Participation 0.0183**** 0.0146*** 
 (0.010) (0.040) 
Time • Indigenous Identifier 0.1290e -4** 0.1340e -4*** 
 (0.051) (0.041) 
Indigenous Identifier • Participation -0.0223** -0.0177* 
 (0.057) (0.134) 
Time • Participation                                      (DD) -0.1950e -4**** -0.1940e -4**** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Time • Participation • Indigenous              (DDD) 0.0239e -4 -0.0284e -4 
 (0.778) (0.736) 
Ages 12 to 14 Observations: 13472 13472 
Time                                                  (Coefficient)                                                     0.3130e -4**** 0.3060e -4**** 
                                                                (P-Score)                        (0.000) (0.000) 
Indigenous Identifier 0.0236* 0.0047 
 (0.108) (0.758) 
Participation 0.0197** 0.0160* 
 (0.067) (0.139) 
Time • Indigenous Identifier 0.1630e -4* 0.1650 e-4* 
 (0.106) (0.101) 
Indigenous Identifier • Participation -0.0127 -0.0106 
 (0.478) (0.554) 
Time • Participation                                      (DD) -0.177e -4*** -0.1750e -4*** 
 (0.021) (0.022) 
Time • Participation • Indigenous              (DDD) -0.9180 -0.0942e -4 
 (0.477) (0.463) 
Ages 12 Observations: 4961 4953 
Time                                                  (Coefficient)                                                     0.3840e -4**** 0.3840e -4**** 
                                                                (P-Score)                        (0.000) (0.000) 
Indigenous Identifier 0.0181 -0.0068 
 (0.475) (0.799) 
Participation 0.0210 0.0187 
 (0.269) (0.328) 
Time • Indigenous Identifier 0.1630e -4 -0.1400e -4 
 (0.349) (0.419) 
Indigenous Identifier • Participation -0.0171 -0.0202 
 (0.585) (0.516) 
Time • Participation                                      (DD) -0.0259e -4** -0.2630e -4*** 
 (0.051) (0.046) 
Time • Participation • Indigenous              (DDD) 0.1160e -4 0.1470e -4 
 (0.602) (0.506) 
Notes:  
i) Four asterisks (****) indicate significance over 99%, three (***) indicate significance over 
95%, two (**) indicate significance over 90%, and one (*) indicates significance over 85%. 
ii) Control variable outcomes are not reported in the interests of brevity; nonetheless, they are 
available in the appendix. 
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 C. Illness Rates: 
 Table 15 on the following page reports results concerning Oportunidades‟ impact on 
illness rates for young children across three age ranges: zero to five, three to five, and under 
three.  Just like the progression and repeat rates, these outcomes are combined into one table that 
illustrates a consistent trend.  Double difference estimations (DD) for all three groups suggest 
that the program has decreased illness rates anywhere from .2 to 3.5%.  These magnitudes appear 
to be greatest for the under 3 year old group and smallest for the three to five group; however, 
none of them are statistically significant above the 80% level and most are considerably less 
significant.  As a result, the precision and accuracy of these results can not be held in great 
confidence.   
It is noteworthy to point out that these average program effect estimations differ 
substantially from Gertler‟s aforementioned findings.  This discrepancy, like those above, is 
most likely due to differences in the sample size, the approach used, definitions of variables, or a 
misspecification.  Triple difference illness rate estimates (DDD) prove to be extremely 
statistically insignificant for all three age ranges.  Though this does not provide a great deal of 
insight with respects to the outcomes and experiences of Oportunidades‟ beneficiaries, it does 
suggest that there is no difference between the program’s general and indigenous impacts.  In 
other words, based on these findings it is apparent that the illness component of this study’s 
hypothesis can be rejected, though more investigation is certainly necessary to alleviate 
robustness complications. 
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Table 15: Indigenous Illness Triple Difference Results 
 
Variables 
Indigenous 1  
No Controls 
Indigenous 1 
Controls 
Ages 0 to 5 Observations: 12766 12766 
Time                                                  (Coefficient)                                                     -0.1119**** -0.0515**** 
                                                                (P-Score)                        (0.000) (0.003) 
Indigenous Identifier 0.0002 0.0192 
 (0.993) (0.308) 
Participation 0.0016 0.0025 
 (0.903) (0.855) 
Time • Indigenous Identifier -0.0725**** -0.0715**** 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
Indigenous Identifier • Participation -0.0023 -0.0031 
 (0.916) (0.888) 
Time • Participation                                      (DD) -0.0260 -0.0259 
 (0.188) (0.190) 
Time • Participation • Indigenous              (DDD) 0.0006 -0.0017 
 (0.986) (0.960) 
Ages 3 to 5: 7579 7579 
Time                                                  (Coefficient)                                                     -0.0614**** -0.0470*** 
                                                                (P-Score)                        (0.005) (0.035) 
Indigenous Identifier 0.0251 0.0525** 
 (0.405) (0.095) 
Participation -0.0199 -0.0104 
 (0.391) (0.656) 
Time • Indigenous Identifier -0.0878**** -0.0899**** 
 (0.008) (0.006) 
Indigenous Identifier • Participation -0.0044 -0.0151 
 (0.907) (0.687) 
Time • Participation                                      (DD) -0.0022 -0.0068 
 (0.936) (0.800) 
Time • Participation • Indigenous              (DDD) 0.0026 0.0057 
 (0.953) (0.899) 
Under 3 Years-old: 5187 5187 
Time                                                  (Coefficient)                                                     -0.1165**** -0.0902*** 
                                                                (P-Score)                        (0.004) (0.029) 
Indigenous Identifier -0.0121 -0.0020 
 (0.604) (0.940) 
Participation 0.0114 0.0097 
 (0.535) (0.595) 
Time • Indigenous Identifier -0.0548 -0.0445 
 (0.448) (0.542) 
Indigenous Identifier • Participation 0.0008 -0.0080 
 (0.978) (0.791) 
Time • Participation                                      (DD) -0.0344 -0.0264 
 (0.529) (0.631) 
Time • Participation • Indigenous              (DDD) 0.0004 -0.0181 
 (0.997) (0.849) 
Notes:  
i) Four asterisks (****) indicate significance over 99%, three (***) indicate significance over 
95%, two (**) indicate significance over 90%, and one (*) indicates significance over 85%. 
ii) Control variable outcomes are not reported in the interests of brevity; nonetheless, they are 
available in the appendix. 
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 D. In Sum: 
Taking into account this illness estimate and the fairly consistent trend of outcomes for 
education variable makes it exceedingly clear that a difference in indigenous impacts is 
extremely unlikely.  There is little to no proof in support of this study‟s human capital 
accumulation hypothesis.  To the contrary, there is an unwavering pattern of evidence 
demonstrating that indigenous beneficiaries do not benefit more or less than general participants 
from Oportunidades.  This analysis provides sufficient justification to reject the hypothesis that 
the impact of Oportunidades on human capital (measured by school enrollment, progression, 
repeat, and illness rates) differs between the general beneficiary population and indigenous 
beneficiary population in Mexico.  
Although Oportunidades does not appear to have created the expected situation, there is a 
clear need for further investigation of this issue on numerous fronts.  For starters, effort should 
be spent reviewing the specification of regressions undertaken in this study.  Moreover, similar 
types of analyses should be applied to alternative human capital variables (and welfare measures) 
before coming to a final conclusion.  For instance, tests should be run on school dropout rates, 
the demand for health services, anemia rates, consumption and caloric acquisitions measures, 
expected wages, poverty rates, and so forth, to provide a more comprehensive view, point out 
exceptions, and strengthen understanding of this complicated situation.  
 
7. Conclusion & Implications: 
 It is clear that the Oportunidades‟ impacts do not differ for indigenous people, but why is 
this and what does it mean?  First of all, it is important to highlight that the data used for this 
study may be so concentrated in poverty that it provides few observable variations.  Hence, the 
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findings of this study suggest that within poor populations in Mexico, disadvantages are not 
necessarily predicated on indigenousness.  A positive implication of these findings is that 
Oportunidades‟ design and implementation is not biased.  It is reaching the extreme poor 
regardless of if they are indigenous or not. This can be considered as step in the right direction 
due to the historical discrimination that indigenous people have suffered. 
 On the other hand, the finding that human capital outcomes are consistent across groups, 
regardless of indigenousness, poses a seriously worrisome question for Oportunidades: if the 
program is not disproportionately benefiting indigenous beneficiaries, who are often poorer and 
more marginalized than their non-indigenous counterparts, then it is contributing to an increase 
in inequality between indigenous and non-indigenous people.  For instance, if indigenous 
progression rates start off at a lower level, but increase at the same pace as the general population, 
then the indigenous progression gap will widen.  Although the overall human capital situation 
may improve under such circumstances, this increase in disparity is an irrevocably negative 
outcome that will exacerbate problems over the long run, if it is not addressed expediently.  
Special attention needs to be paid by Oportunidades to avoid making already marginalized 
indigenous groups worse off relative to Mexico‟s general poor and non-poor populations. 
 These findings are also distressing because of the well-established fact that indigenous 
groups do have to overcome more challenges than others to rise out of poverty and succeed.  
Thus, indigenous children, more than others, need to prevent illnesses, enroll in schools, expedite 
school progression, and avoid repeating grades at higher rates to accumulate sufficient human 
capital to merely maintain current inequality levels, open up new doors, or even increase their 
welfare.  If indigenous individuals do not experience a sizeable boost in human capital 
accumulation, how will they overcome the smaller wages they are paid and the higher likelihood 
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that they will fall into poverty?
174
  Aggravating this matter is evidence demonstrating that 
indigenous students suffer from diminishing returns to education.
175
  Subsequently, it may be 
argued by some that combating indigenous poverty via human capital accumulation will provide 
insufficient benefits, relative to costs, to be regarded as truly effective (regardless of how few 
other options exist).  In such a case, it is argued that investigating and implementing effective 
alternative strategies must become an immediate priority in order to overcome the numerous 
entrenched obstacles that stand in the way of progress for Mexico‟s indigenous peoples. 
 It should also be pointed out that although Oportunidades‟ impacts on indigenous and 
general beneficiary groups appear statistically similar, by no means does this indicate that their 
experiences in the program are alike.  In fact, allegorical evidence demonstrates that indigenous 
groups have a more difficult time complying with conditionalities because of language and 
cultural barriers.  De la Brière notes that the willingness of the indigenous to participate in 
Oportunidades is diminished due to these unique challenges, while the frustrations associated 
with participating in the program are heightened.
176
  This is namely because Oportunidades (and 
other conditional cash transfer programs) neither design their interventions specifically for 
Mexico‟s indigenous population nor tailor elements of them to accommodate the needs of 
specific groups who experience inimitable barriers.
177
 
 In addition, the fact that primary school is not taught solely in Spanish, particularly in 
highly indigenous areas, while secondary school is exclusively taught in Spanish serves as an 
additional hurdle for indigenous children to grapple with.
178
  Indigenous children appear to be 
partially overcoming this obstacle because their enrollment, progression, and repeat education 
rate increases as a result of the program do not differ from those of the general the beneficiary 
group; nonetheless, the difficulty and frustration associated with this transition should not simply 
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be discounted.  It is one of the many real life challenges that symbolize the relatively inferior 
status of indigenous groups in Mexico‟s society.   
 The experience of indigenous beneficiaries may be most different and difficult with 
respects to Oportunidades‟ health components.  This is due to the fact that clear communication 
and general sense of welcome are paramount in this type of setting.  Allegorical evidence 
suggests that indigenous beneficiaries suffer greatly from a lack of unambiguous correspondence 
and comfort at health clinics where doctors, nurses, and staff do not effectively understand the 
particular needs of clients or convey essential information.
179
   
As a result, indigenous patients feel uncomfortable, frustrated, and even disrespected at 
health clinics because of an alienating setting and resultant miscommunications.
180
  Not 
surprisingly, some indigenous beneficiaries prefer to avoid the chaotic and demeaning 
experience of visiting health clinics.
181
  Subsequently, it is apparent that there are numerous 
reasons why the experience of indigenous beneficiaries likely differs from those of the general 
beneficiary population.  Most of these differences appear to be disadvantageous for the 
indigenous poor of Mexico, as well as Oportunidades.  That being said, additional research, 
particularly investigations that employ more qualitative information gathering techniques, should 
be undertaken to comprehensively and deeply survey this critical issue.   
In the end, it is evident that the most vital policy implication that can be made is that a 
broad set of programs need to be designed to specifically meet the needs of the indigenous poor.  
Their circumstances are unique and in need of vast educational, health, labor, economic, and 
welfare improvements; particularly those that eradicate inequality, instead of furthering it.  Some 
of these changes are unlikely to be provided by demand side subsidies, such as conditional cash 
transfer programs like Oportunidades, because they are policy issues or necessitate supply side 
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interventions.  Consequently, the fact that poor families do recognize the benefits of good quality 
education and are often prepared to sacrifice in order to invest in the future of their children, is 
inadequate to induce substantial increases in human capital accumulation and reductions in 
poverty;  complimentary interventions are also needed.
182
   
So how else will the intergenerational poverty be broken?  What will it take to break the 
self perpetuating cycle of (indigenous) marginalization?  Tailored investment in indigenous 
human capital accumulation and alternative strategies, including fully integrated demand and 
supply side interventions, must be intensified to close existing indigenous poverty and human 
capital gaps; otherwise indigenous Mexicans will remain in profound and persistent poverty 
because of the unique and overwhelming obstacles they face (or even become more marginalized 
due to rising inequality).  In conclusion, this study highlights the need to find tangible action-
oriented answers to the following urgent research question: what alternatives strategies tailored 
to the needs of the indigenous are available, feasible, and expected to be the most effective? 
  
58 
 
8. References: 
Bando, R., Lopez-Calva, L., and Patrinos, H., Child Labor, School Attendance, and Indigenous 
Households: Evidence from Mexico, World Bank Research Working Paper No. 3487 
(Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, January 2005). 
Becker, G.S., Human Capital (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1975). 
Behrman, J.R., Sengupta, P., and Todd, P., Progression through PROGRESA: An Impact 
Assessment of a School Subsidy Experiment, Project Papers and Briefs (Washington, D.C.: 
IFPRI, April 2001). 
De la Brière, B., personal conversation, Conditional Cash Transfers: A Fresh Assessment, 
International Development Forum (Washington, D.C.: School of International Service at 
American University, March 28, 2006). 
Coady, D., The Application of Social Cost-Benefit Analysis to the Evaluation of PROGRESA, 
Final report submitted to PROGRESA. (Washington, D.C.: IFPRI, 2000). 
Currie, J., Welfare and the Well Being of Children: Fundamentals of Pure and Applied 
Economics (Chur, Switzerland: Harwood Academic, 1995). 
Gertler, P., The Impact of PROGRESA on Health, Final reported submitted to PROGRESSA 
(Washington, D.C.: IFPRI, 2000). 
Gertler, P., Do Conditional Cash Transfers Improve Child Health? Evidence from PROGRESA‟s 
Control Randomized Experiment, Health, Health Care, and Economic Development, Vol. 94, 
No. 2 (May 2004), pp. 336-341.  
Hanson, G., Globalization, Labor Income, and Poverty in Mexico, NBER Working Paper No. 
11027 (San Diego, CA: University of San Diego, 2005). 
Hoddinott, J., Skoufias, E., and Washburn, R., The Impacts of PROGRESA on Consumption, 
Final report submitted to PROGRESSA (Washington, D.C: IFPRI, 2000). 
Grosh, M., Administering Targeting Social Programs in Latin America: From Platitudes to 
Practice (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1994). 
Ilahi, N., Orazem, O., and Sedlacek, G., The Implications of Child Labor and Adult Wages, 
Income, and Poverty: Retrospective Evidence from Brazil, mimeo (Washington, D.C.: The 
World Bank, 2000). 
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) America, Mexico‟s Oportunidades: An Interview with 
Miguel Szekely, Undersecretary of Social Development, IDB America Online; available from 
http://www.iadb.org/idbamerica/index.cfm?thisid=3169; Internet; accessed on November 20, 
2005. 
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) America, The Story Behind PROGRESA, IDB 
America Online; available from http://www.iadb.org/idbamerica/index.cfm?thisid=3049; 
Internet; accessed on November 20, 2005. 
59 
 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), PROGRESA, IFPRI Online; available 
from http://www.ifpri.org/themes/progresa.htm; Internet; accessed on November 20, 2005. 
Levy, S. and Rodriguez, E., Economic Crisis, Political Transition and Poverty Policy Reform: 
Mexico’s PROGRESA-Oportunidades Program (Washington, D.C: IDB, 2004). 
Lipton, M. and Ravallion, M., Poverty and Policy, Handbook of Development Economics, Vol. 
III., ed. by Behrman and Srinivasan (North-Holland, 1999), pp. 2553-2675. 
Maluccio, J., Coping with the „Coffee Crisis‟ in Central America: The Role of the Nicaraguan 
Red de Protección Social, FCND Discussion Paper, No. 188 (Washington, D.C.: IFPRI, 
February 2005). 
Mayer, S.E., What Money Can’t Buy: Family Income and Children’s Life Chances (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1997). 
McEwan, P.J., The Indigenous Test Score Gap in Bolivia and Chile, Economic Development and 
Cultural Change, Vol. 53, No. 1 (October 2005), pp. 157-190. 
Mincer, J., Schooling, Experience, and Earnings (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974). 
De la O Campos, A.P., personal conversation (Washington, D.C.: School of International Service 
at American University, April 4, 2006). 
Parker, S.W. and Teurel, G., Schooling Inequality and Language Barriers, Documento de 
Trabajo, Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (Mexico, 2003). 
Psacharopoulos, G., Ethnicity, Education, and Earnings in Bolivia and Guatemala, Comparative 
Education Review, Vol. 37, No. 1, Special Issues on Ethnicity (February 1993), pp. 9-20. 
Psacharopoulos, G. and Patrinos, H., Indigenous People and Poverty in Latin America 
(Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1996). 
Ravallion, M., The Mystery of the Vanishing Benefits: Ms. Speedy Analyst‟s Introduction to 
Evaluation, World Bank Economic Review Vol. 15, No. 1, (2001), pp. 115-140. 
Shultz, T.P., Investing in Human Capital, American Economic Review, Vol. 51, No. 1 (March 
1961), pp. 1-17. 
Shultz, T.P., The Impact of PROGRESA on School Enrollments, Final report submitted to 
PROGRESA, (Washington, D.C.: IFPRI, 2000). 
Skoufias, E. and Parker, S.W., Conditional Cash Transfers and their Impact on Child Work and 
Schooling: Evidence from the PROGRESA Program in Mexico, FCND Discussion Paper, No. 
123 (Washington D.C: IFPRI, 2001). 
Skoufias, E., PROGRESA and its Impacts on the Welfare of Rural Households in Mexico, 
Research Report, No. 139 (Washington, D.C.: IFPRI, 2005). 
  
60 
 
9. Appendix:  
 Though the influence of control variables is not dissected in this investigation due to a 
lack of space, assessing their power to sway outcomes is a worthwhile endeavor.  The marginal 
effects of control variables for most regressions are consequently reported below for the reader‟s 
convenience and to facilitate additional evaluation of this topic: 
Table 8a: Ages 8 to 15 Indigenous Enrollment Controls 
Variables: Indigenous 1 
Controls 
Indigenous 2 
Controls 
Observations:  48509 48509 
Household Size                                 (Coefficient) -0.0018**** -0.0020**** 
                                                                (P-Score) (0.003) (0.001) 
Age -0.0588**** -0.0591**** 
 (0.000) (0.0000) 
Male 0.0226**** 0.0229**** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Head Years of Education 0.0115**** 0.0118**** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Total Land Used/Owned 0.0008*** 0.0006** 
 (0.037) (0.071) 
Owns Cattle 0.0016**** 0.0014**** 
 (0.000) (0.001) 
Electricity 0.0331**** 0.0369**** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Earth-floor -0.0031 0.0017 
 (0.322) (.586) 
Marginalization Index -0.0178**** -0.0052** 
 (0.000) (0.052) 
Education Committee 0.0026 -0.0122**** 
 (0.392) (0.000) 
Secondary School -0.0102 0.0029 
 (0.768) (0.764) 
Guerrero -0.0559**** -0.0652**** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Hidalgo -0.0072* -0.0107*** 
 (0.147) (0.034) 
Michocan -0.0424**** -0.0640**** 
 (0.000) (0.0000) 
Puebla -0.0331**** -0.0428**** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Queretaro -0.0915**** -0.1046**** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
San Luis 0.0101*** -0.0011 
 (0.036) (0.826) 
Notes:  
i) Four asterisks (****) indicate significance over 99%, three (***) indicate significance over 
95%, two (**) indicate significance over 90%, and one (*) indicates significance over 85%. 
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Table 9a: Ages 12 to 14 Indigenous Enrollment Controls 
 
Variables 
Indigenous 1 
Controls 
Indigenous 2 
Controls 
Observations: 18141 18141 
Household Size                                 (Coefficient) -0.0047**** -0.0049**** 
                                                                (P-Score) (0.001) (0.000) 
Age -0.1108**** -0.1108**** 
 (0.000) (0.0000) 
Male 0.0600**** 0.0606**** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Head Years of Education 0.0198**** 0.0208**** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Total Land Used/Owned 0.0008 0.0007** 
 (0.306) (0.375) 
Owns Cattle 0.0026*** 0.0022*** 
 (0.014) (0.029) 
Electricity 0.0598**** 0.0665**** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Earth-floor -0.0006 0.0078 
 (0.935) (.275) 
Marginalization Index -0.0322**** -0.0099** 
 (0.000) (0.090) 
Education Committee 0.0004 0.0069 
 (0.948) (0.295) 
Secondary School -0.0239 -0.0456 
 (0.785) (0.609) 
Guerrero -0.0564**** -0.0689**** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Hidalgo -0.0099 -0.0165* 
 (0.369) (0.137) 
Michocan -0.0787**** -0.1140**** 
 (0.000) (0.0000) 
Puebla -0.0614**** -0.0804**** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Queretaro -0.1382**** -0.1610**** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
San Luis 0.0228*** -0.0039 
 (0.036) (0.718) 
Notes:  
i) Four asterisks (****) indicate significance over 99%, three (***) indicate significance over 
95%, two (**) indicate significance over 90%, and one (*) indicates significance over 85%. 
 
Table 10a: Age 12 Indigenous Enrollment Controls 
 
Variables 
Indigenous 1 
Controls 
Indigenous 2 
Controls 
Observations: 6425  6425 
Household Size                                 (Coefficient) -0.0023 -0.0025 
                                                                (P-Score) (0.206) (0.179) 
Male 0.0564**** 0.0564**** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Head Years of Education 0.0128**** 0.0130**** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Total Land Used/Owned 0.0004 0.0003** 
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 (0.706) (0.795) 
Owns Cattle 0.0032*** 0.0032*** 
 (0.039) (0.043) 
Electricity 0.0278*** 0.0297**** 
 (0.011) (0.007) 
Earth-floor -0.0056 0.0017 
 (0.552) (.855) 
Marginalization Index -0.0259**** -0.0133** 
 (0.001) (0.078) 
Education Committee -0.0054 0.0086 
 (0.544) (0.338) 
Secondary School -0.0000 -0.0386 
 (1.000) (0.761) 
Guerrero -0.0704**** -0.0779**** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Hidalgo -0.0354*** -0.0397**** 
 (0.019) (0.009) 
Michocan -0.0567**** -0.0788**** 
 (0.001) (0.0000) 
Puebla -0.0435**** -0.0558**** 
 (0.003) (0.000) 
Queretaro -0.1199**** -0.1365**** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
San Luis 0.0113 0.0010 
 (0.442) (0.948) 
Notes:  
i) Four asterisks (****) indicate significance over 99%, three (***) indicate significance over 
95%, two (**) indicate significance over 90%, and one (*) indicates significance over 85%. 
 
 
Table 13a: Indigenous Progression Controls 
 
Variables 
8 to 15 
Indigenous 1 
Controls 
12 to 14 
Indigenous 1 
Controls 
12 
Indigenous 1 
Controls 
Observations: 37533  13472 4961 
Household Size                                 (Coefficient) -0.0063**** -0.0089**** -0.0100**** 
                                                                (P-Score) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Age -0.0400**** -0.0558**** N/A 
 (0.000) (0.000) N/A 
Male 0.0093** 0.0537**** 0.0475**** 
 (0.054) (0.000) (0.000) 
Head Years of Education 0.0147**** 0.0192**** 0.0137**** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Total Land Used/Owned 0.0009 0.0010 -0.0018 
 (0.174) (0.371) (0.284) 
Owns Cattle 0.0025**** 0.0029*** 0.0030** 
 (0.001) (0.014) (0.073) 
Electricity 0.0271**** 0.0511**** 0.0398**** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.021) 
Earth-floor -0.0048 -0.0134 -0.0279** 
 (0.387) (0.157) (0.053) 
Marginalization Index -0.0146**** -0.0318**** -0.0140 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.267) 
Education Committee 0.0031 -0.0094 -0.0075 
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 (0.571) (0.302) (0.590) 
Secondary School 0.0267 -0.0436 0.0863 
 (0.660) (0.706) (0.644) 
Guerrero -0.0922**** -0.0656**** -0.0920**** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) 
Hidalgo 0.0054 -0.0318*** -0.0520*** 
 (0.520) (0.031) (0.021) 
Michocan -0.0069 -0.0674**** -0.0566*** 
 (0.442) (0.000) (0.021) 
Puebla -0.0182*** -0.0482**** -0.0429*** 
 (0.024) (0.001) (0.048) 
Queretaro 0.0071**** -0.8259**** -0.0692*** 
 (0.557) (0.000) (0.037) 
San Luis 0.0486**** 0.0522**** 0.0287 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.179) 
Notes:  
i) Four asterisks (****) indicate significance over 99%, three (***) indicate significance over 
95%, two (**) indicate significance over 90%, and one (*) indicates significance over 85%. 
 
 
Table 14a: Indigenous Repeat Controls 
 
 
Variables 
8 to 15 
Indigenous 1 
Controls 
12 to 14 
Indigenous 1 
Controls 
12 
Indigenous 1 
Controls 
Observations: 37533 13472 4953  
Household Size                                 (Coefficient) 0.0038**** 0.0035**** 0.0072**** 
                                                                (P-Score) (0.000) (0.010) (0.002) 
Age -0.0179**** -0.0179**** N/A 
 (0.000) (0.000) N/A 
Male 0.0158**** 0.0027 0.0018 
 (0.000) (0.654) (0.864) 
Head Years of Education -0.0036**** -0.0013 -0.0032* 
 (0.000) (0.316) (0.146) 
Total Land Used/Owned -0.9230e -4 -0.7340e -4 0.0015 
 (0.863) (0.925) (0.293) 
Owns Cattle -0.0009** -0.0007 -0.0009 
 (0.100) (0.324) (0.454) 
Electricity 0.0044 0.0040 -0.0157 
 (0.406) (0.620) (0.256) 
Earth-floor 0.0081** 0.0195**** 0.0238*** 
 (0.070) (0.004) (0.040) 
Marginalization Index -0.0041 -0.0043 -0.0094 
 (0.308) (0.479) (0.351) 
Education Committee 0.0016 0.0040 0.0281*** 
 (0.726) (0.522) (0.014) 
Secondary School 0.0130 -0.0358 N/A 
 (0.338) (0.648) N/A 
Guerrero 0.0338**** 0.0144 0.0263 
 (0.000) (0.288) (0.274) 
Hidalgo -0.0034 0.0219*** 0.0217 
 (0.610) (0.034) (0.228) 
Michocan -0.0404*** -0.0371**** -0.0183 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.339) 
Puebla -0.0026 0.0030 0.0069 
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 (0.681) (0.757) (0.686) 
Queretaro -0.0639**** -0.0377**** -0.0293 
 (0.000) (0.010) (0.242) 
San Luis -0.0345**** -0.0304**** -0.0201 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.234) 
Notes:  
i) Four asterisks (****) indicate significance over 99%, three (***) indicate significance over 
95%, two (**) indicate significance over 90%, and one (*) indicates significance over 85%. 
ii) Secondary school is dropped for age 12 because the absence of one perfectly predicts failure. 
 
 
Table 15a: Indigenous Illness Controls 
 
Variables 
0 to 5 
Indigenous 1 
Controls 
3 to 5 
Indigenous 1 
Controls 
Under 3 
Indigenous 1 
Controls 
Observations: 12766  7579 5187  
Household Size                                 (Coefficient) -0.0075**** -0.0073**** -0.0074**** 
                                                                (P-Score) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) 
Age -0.0297**** -0.0136*** -0.0528**** 
 (0.000) (0.039) (0.000) 
Male -0.0010 -0.0100 0.0122 
 (0.894) (0.283) (0.360) 
Head Years of Education 0.0003 0.0018 -0.0019 
 (0.845) (0.321) (0.455) 
Total Land Used/Owned 0.0012 0.0018** -0.955e -4 
 (0.229) (0.096) (0.957) 
Owns Cattle 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 
 (0.892) (0.919) (0.906) 
Electricity 0.0132 0.0177 0.0099 
 (0.186) (0.135) (0.558) 
Earth-floor -0.0521**** -0.0580**** -0.0383*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.014) 
Marginalization Index -0.0031 0.0024 -0.0068 
 (0.669) (0.788) (0.590) 
Education Committee 0.0014 -0.0064 -0.0097 
 (0.866) (0.512) (0.504) 
Secondary School 0.0332 0.0609*** .1245 
 (0.768) (0.021) (0.624) 
Guerrero 0.0186 -0.0123 0.0648*** 
 (0.288) (0.555) (0.031) 
Hidalgo -0.0236** 0.0009 -0.0621**** 
 (0.064) (0.951) (0.004) 
Michocan 0.0269** 0.0216 0.0402 
 (0.078) (0.232) (0.125) 
Puebla -0.0138 -0.0222* -0.0023 
 (0.280) (0.141) (0.918) 
Queretaro -0.0696**** -0.0432*** -0.1067**** 
 (0.000) (0.039) (0.001) 
San Luis -0.0280*** -0.0269**** -0.0262 
 (0.026) (0.075)** (0.222) 
Notes:  
i) Four asterisks (****) indicate significance over 99%, three (***) indicate significance over 
95%, two (**) indicate significance over 90%, and one (*) indicates significance over 85%. 
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